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ABSTRACT
This is an essay on the labeling literature, some reflec­
tions, some critical comments, some tenative ideas. The essay 
is an unfamiliar form for a sociological thesis. A reader 
demands to know one’s hypothesis, or at least theoretical 
position where no empirical evidence is available. But label­
ing has been plagued by hypotheses and theoretical stances, 
so much so that some of its insights into deviance have been 
obscured. It needs a fresh interpretation, one that high­
lights the social issues it seeks to explain, and a fresh 
assessment in light of those issues. That is the goal of 
this essay.
What follows presents an inventory of labeling1s ideas, 
a critical assessment of their conceptual and empirical use­
fulness and a methodological strategy for understanding the 
central issues described by labeling. In particular, the 
essay concentrates on labeling’s assertion that social mean­
ings and social reactions are important components of an 
understanding of deviance in modern societies. Although 
labeling’s treatment of these components is found wanting, 
the components themselves are still seen as essential to 
sociological and criminological inquiry.
An ideal type framework is developed, using Weber as an 
authority. Four types are distinguished: respectable, 
involuntary, aberrant and dissident deviance. Each is suggested 
as having distinct social meanings; and each meaning is 
suggested as having a distinct influence on the likelihood 
that labeling or deterrence will result from official 
sanctioning. A brief application of this methodological 
strategy to juvenile delinquency suggests its heuristic 
validity.
A CRITIQUE OF THE LABELING APPROACH 
TOWARD A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE
INTRODUCTION
This essay is about the labeling approach and its under­
standing of deviance in modern society. It is not, for a 
number of reasons, a particularly timely topic. For one 
thing, judging by the opinions recently expressed in journals 
and professional meetings, a considerable number of social 
scientists are ready to discard the .approach as either hope­
lessly ambiguous or simply exhausted (see Gibbs, 1972;
Manning, 1973; 1975). Moreover, recent assessments of the 
approach are directed toward uncovering its "latent conserva­
tive biases" (see Gouldner, 1968; Liazos, 1972; Davis, 1972; 
Schervish, 1973; Thio, 1973), an event in current sociology 
that usually sounds the death toll—  recall the criticisms 
of Parsons1s system’s theory. In. brief, the popular validity 
that sustained labeling during the seven years •following 
Becker’s (1963) Outsiders has been replaced by an equally 
popular scepticism.
Of course, one can always go against the tide, support 
labeling against the current conventional wisdom. But even 
the approach’s original theorists are raising damaging cri­
ticisms about labeling’s empirical and conceptual status. In 
the second edition to a collection of originally formative 
essays on labeling, Lemert (197 2: 16) describes the approach’s
2
3development in a single terse paragraph.
What began as some tenative and loosely linked ideas 
about deviance and societal reactions in my writings 
subsequently were replaced by the theoretical state­
ments of Becker that social groups create deviance and 
that deviant behavior is that which is so labeled. This 
position got further elucidation in Eriksdn's function­
alist derived position that the social audience is the 
critical factor in deviance study. In retrospect these 
must be regarded as conceptual extrusions largely re­
sponsible for-the indiscriminating application of label-, 
ing theory to a diversity of research and writing on 
deviance. Unfortunately, the impression of crude socio­
logical determinism left by the Becker and Erikson state­
ments has been amplified by the tendency of many deviance 
studies to be preoccupied with the work of official agents 
of social control, accenting the arbitrariness of official 
action, stereotyped decision-making in bureaucratic con­
texts, bias in the administration of law, and the general 
preemptive nature of societyTs control over deviants.
Although Lemert urges the "proper" development of labeling, 
Manning (197 3) suggests that this essay signifies the 
approach*s inevitable atrophy, bringing to an end the concep­
tual period initiated by labeling theorists. Lemert (19 74) 
himself justifies the argument, for several years later in a 
presidential address to the Society for the Study of Social 
Problems he urges theorists to abandon earlier claims and to 
go beyond Mead’s interactionist framework.
Why then write about the labeling approach? For one 
thing, present criticism crudely reject the entire approach, 
and although labeling possesses a number of misleading claims-, 
many of which will be presented in a later part of this essay, 
it also possesses some insightful and frequently neglected 
directions for deviancy studies. Unlike the normative perspec­
tive, in which research focuses on the personal and social 
characteristics of deviants, the labeling approach draws
4- k - • / ' ...
attention to the interaction between those who commit deviant 
acts and those in a position to pass moral judgments upon those 
actors. Accordingly, research and theory-building over the 
past ten years has been directed toward a number of important 
questions about deviance and social reactions: When is a 
deviant act likely to be severely sanctioned? When is a 
deviant act likely to stimulate little or no reaction? Whose 
rules are enforced by legitimate social reactions? Under what 
conditions are these rules enforced? Who applies the deviant 
label to whom? What consequences does the application of a 
deviant label have for a person? These are significant ques­
tions that are neglected by normative theorists, and they are 
questions that are obscured by a hasty rejection of labeling's 
central focus.
Furthermore, an overly simplified rejection of labeling 
obscures the re-emphasis the approach places on classical 
concerns about the social meanings of deviance in modern 
society. Although normative theorists ostensibly note the 
modern context in which deviance occurs (there is always some 
mention of normative plurality), they do not direct research 
or theory toward understanding this context. Rather normative 
studies concentrate on the legitimate but narrow issue of 
what causes people to commit deviant acts; they do not attempt 
to understand the relationships between deviance, ascribed 
social meanings and the social order of modern society. It 
was, ironically, Durkheim who concerned himself and his writings 
with these relationships. In the Division of Labor (1964a),
Durkheim described the precariousness of solidarity in modern 
society, and he briefly elaborated the role deviance plays 
both in upsetting and reinforcing that solidarity. His later 
works, especially Suicide (19 52) and Rules of Sociological 
Method (1964b), further explored some of the roles deviance 
plays in modern society, such as providing a focus for group 
identification or as heralding a new collective conscience. 
Like labeling theorists (see Erikson, 19 66; Douglas, 1970a), 
Durkheim conceived of the study of deviance as the study of 
the affirmation and construction of moral meanings in every­
day life. It is this concern with the broader social mean­
ings of deviance, especially as they are designated by social 
reactions, that is lost by a total rejection of the approach.
Labeling also, at least potentially, converges with 
several current orientations in sociology and criminology.
For one, the conflict approach, represented by such theorists 
as Sellin (1938), Void (1958), Turk (1966) and Quinney (1970), 
describe modern society as involving moral disagreement-.
Sellin (1938: 29) makes this point in a passage that adum­
brates labelingfs description of the modern world.
The more complex a culture becomes, the more likely it 
is that a number of normative groups which affect a 
person will be large, and the greater the chance that 
the norms of these groups will fail to agree, no matter 
how much they overlap as a result of common acceptance.
Another complementary approach centers around the studies on
"respectable" deviance. In an article on white-collar crime,
Sutherland (194 0) argues that rarely is deviant behavior
committed by people of high status in the course of their
occupation recorded in police statistics. Although these 
deviants cost men and women considerably more than convention­
al criminals (Sutherland and Cressey, 1974; Pearce, 1973), 
they rarely face the same amount of social reaction that is 
directed toward lower status criminals. Both Sutherland and 
Sellin suggest, like the labeling theorists, that deviance in 
modern society is intricately associated with social defini­
tions and the power of some to have their definitions strictly 
enforced. By emphasizing the importance of reactions in ex­
plaining deviant behavior, labeling suggests some social 
relationships that would more fully integrate the studies on 
conflict and respectable crime.
All of this, the research questions, the classical 
issues, the convergence with studies on conflict and respec­
table deviance, is not presented as evidence of labelingfs 
extraordinary explanatory powers. As many have argued, the 
approach is_ excessively loose, conceptually inconsistent, 
difficult to empirically verify and prone toward vulgariza­
tion and politicalization. But confusion, as Emerson once 
said, need not be indication of defective intelligence: it 
may* at times, be simply an honest mind working on an 
inherently difficult and complex problem. Undoubtedly, some' 
of labeling’s difficulties indicate just this honest reflec­
tion on an inherently complex problem—  the social meanings of 
deviance in modern society. By concentrating simply on the 
approach?s conceptual and empirical confusion, the critics 
obscure the complexity of the social issues it seeks to
understand. The task of criticism, therefore , is to assess 
labeling according to these issues, according to the concep­
tual problems it seeks to unravel, and where it is found 
wanting, suggest alternative strategies for research and 
theory. This is the task of this thesis.
There are, however, a number of issues and problems 
associated with labeling, and their conceptual complexity 
prevents a thorough assessment of the approach, at least 
within the scope of this paper. As a result7, this paper will 
concentrate primarily on those aspects of labeling that seek 
to understand what is socially made of an act, what that 
definition suggests about social reactions and what conse­
quences those reactions are likely to have for a deviant.
The pages that follow will describe the basic ideas of label­
ing and assess its utility as an explanatory framework. From 
this assessment, especially as it applies to the social mean­
ings of deviance, a different strategy for understanding 
deviance in modern society will be presented, one that will 
hardly solve all the problems revolving around the approach, 
but one that will make some of them more understandable.
CHAPTER I 
INVENTORY OF IDEAS
Although the labeling perspective has dominated the 
literature for twelve years, there is an embarrassing amount 
of disagreement about exactly what is labeling*s approach to 
deviant behavior. Critics seem more confused than anyone.
Rock (1974), for instance, claims that labeling is too phe­
nomenological, enmeshing it. in reductionism, yet Douglas 
(1970a) laments labeling*s lack of phenomenological focus. 
Similarly, Lemert (1974) calls for labeling theorists to go 
beyond Mead*s interactionist perspective, while others 
(see Rogers and Buffalo, 1974; Schervish, 1973) criticize the 
literature for ignoring Mead*s central insights. At times, 
the confusion results from the misguided efforts of critics 
and proponents alike to attribute labeling to some classical 
perspective—  so that the criticism might seem more coherent 
or the defense more convincing. At other times, however, the 
confusion reflects a real looseness in the approach itself 
(Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973), which leads to a pertinent 
question-—  in what way can any set of assumptions and ideas 
assume to be the labeling approach to deviant behavior?
The word labeling hardly captures the subtle differences 
between such theorists as Becker (1963) and Lemert (1951; 1967),
8
9Erikson (1966) and Matza (1969) or Kitsuse (1964) and
Scheff (1966). Still, there is a sense in which a core, a
trunk, can be identified amidst these subtle branches of
labeling, and this, using GibbsTs (1966) term, is labeling1s
"conception" of deviant behavior. Whereas previous theories
conceive of deviance as the infraction of some agreed-upon
rule, portraying deviants as sharing some social or personal
attribute by which the infraction can be explained, labeling
conceives of deviance as the product of social interaction,
logically seperating the act and the judgments people make
about them (Becker, 1971). The following passage by Becker
(19 63: 9), perhaps the most quoted description of labeling’s
position, points this out.
Deviance... is created by society. I do not mean this 
in the way it is ordinarily understood, in which causes 
of deviancies are located in the social situation of 
the deviant or in the "social factors" which prompt his 
action. I mean, rather, social groups create deviance 
by making the rules whose infraction constitutes 
deviance, and by applying those rules to particular 
people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point 
of view, deviance is not a quality of the act a person 
commits, but rather a consequence of the application by 
others of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The 
deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully 
applied; deviant behavior is behavior people so label.
Some people who act oddly are committed to mental hospitals, 
some are not; some people who break the laws are arrested and 
sent to prison, some are not; some people who drink too much 
are labeled "alcoholics," some are not—  the differences be­
tween those who are labeled deviant and those who are not 
depends on what others make of the act, what social judgments 
are made and what responses those judgments provoke from actor
10
and audience alike. According to labeling theorists, deviance 
is not simply a violation of some agreed-upon rule; rather 
deviance is the outcome of processes of social definition and 
social reaction.
In other words, Becker argues that the labels people 
apply to behavior are logically independent, of any act in 
itself. In one sense, such a statement is blatantly true.
Since Durkheim, at least, sociologists and criminologists, have 
recognized that designations such as "normal" and "abnormal," 
"conforming" and "deviant" are socially specific, specific 
to history, cultures and subcultures. Only the most unregener- 
ate biological determinist or structural-functionalist would 
quibble with labeling*s contention that deviance resides in 
social definitions and reactions, rather than in the acts or 
persons committing them (Akers, 19 68). But Becker, as well 
as other labeling proponents, is making a bolder claim: 
the acts people commit and the labels people attach to them 
are seperate, not simply in the abstract but in specific 
situations as well. In this sense, there are no neat categories 
of deviance or crime, only categories of people who have been 
isolated and distinguished from others by the social defini­
tions and reactions applied to them (Kitsuse and Cicourel, 19 63).
As Erikson (19 66) argues, by defining deviance this way, 
the labeling approach highlights certain aspects of deviance 
that had been frequently taken for granted in earlier con­
ceptions. For instance, Merton*s (197 5) theory of anomie, 
still a central framework for deviance research, is designed
11
to account for behavior that strays from community norms, 
regardless of whose standards those norms represent. Con­
sequently, the banker who sifts through the day's loan re­
quests making decisions according to race and the armed robber 
who takes from him the dayfs receipts are both deviants, since 
both in their own way violate the community's norms. But the 
banker, regardless of the effects of his actions, even if he 
is largely a cause of the robbery, faces different consequences 
for his actions than those faced by the armed robber. The 
banker seldom provokes the community's ire, while the armed 
robber sets in motion the community's entire social control 
mechanism. Although the labeling analysts sometimes express
0
interest in "secret" deviants or self-typing, all agree that 
those rule-breakers who are singled out by the police, mental 
health personnel, the courts or other official audiences face 
adjustment problems concerning "spoiled identity" that hidden 
deviants do not. An aim of labeling’s conception, then, is 
to focus attention on the consequences of being labeled an 
outsider, especially when the labeling is done by official 
control agents.
Preeminently, the labeling approach involves an inter­
actional process in which relative social judgments are the 
primary determinant of deviance. This conception of deviance 
has led to several related yet distinguishable lines of 
questioning. The first, and the least elaborated by labeling 
theorists, asks questions about the social order. Whose 
rules are enforced? Whose reactions are likely to be
compelling? The second asks questions about the applica­
tion of labels. Who is more likely to be labeled a deviant? 
What influence do official stereotypes and interests have on 
enforcement policy? Finally, the third line of questioning 
simply asks what are the consequences of being labeled a 
deviant? The following paragraphs present some of the answers 
labeling theorsists have provided to these questions, answers 
that have become known as labelingTs approach to deviant 
behavior.
Rules, Reactions and the Social Order
Whose reactions, whose social judgments are likely to 
be more compelling than others? When labeling theorists 
defined deviance according to actual social reactions, they 
pinpointed a theoretical problem, but not an answer. In other 
words, what is the conceptual difference between rules that 
are not enforced and reactions that are not forceful? Kitsuse 
(1964), for instance, found the reactions of college students 
to homosexuals to be "generally mild." Does a generally 
mild reaction constitute deviance? If not, how harsh must a 
reaction be before it can be described as deviance? Similarly, 
one of Becker’s (1963: 11) observations leads to confusion.
After his example of labeling, in which a young Trobriand 
Islander is "forced" to commit suicide by the public denuncia­
tion of another native, Becker concludes: "You can commit clan 
incest and suffer no more than gossip as long as no one makes 
a public accusation..." Why is gossip an insignificant reaction
13
Whatever the merits of labeling1s position, as Gibbs (19 66) 
points out, it is not without difficulty, for it never says 
exactly what identifies an act as deviant.
Gibbs, of course, is right, but he is right for some not 
so obvious reasons. While labeling is in need of some con­
ceptual housecleaning, the difficulty rests with the very idea 
of labeling or more specifically with the relationship between 
social reactions and labeling. In Kitsuse?s (19 64) study of 
student reactions toward homosexuals, negative responses, 
regardless of their intensity, identified homosexuality as 
deviant. What it did not do, however, is equally important: 
it did not effectively differentiate the homosexuals from the 
other students, the deviants from the nondeviants. This 
differentiation process is what Becker (1963: 9) referred 
to as successful labeling. A frequently quoted passage 
by the early criminologist Tannenbaum (19 38: 19-2 0) describes 
it fairly well.
The process of making the criminal (of successful 
labeling) therefore, is a process of tagging, defining, 
identifying, segregating, describing, emphasizing, 
making conscious and self-conscious; it becomes a way 
of stimulating, suggesting, emphasizing, and evoking 
the very traits that are complained of...The person 
becomes the thing he is described as being.
A reaction to illicit behavior can be almost anything—  from
the generally mild responses of the students in KitsuseTs
study to the more dramatic denunciation of the young Trobriand
Islander—  any of which define the behavior as deviant to
'someone. In this sense, it is odd that labeling proponents
identify reaction as the crucial and forgotten element of
mdeviance. What is crucial, however, is the point at which 
social reactions become social labeling. And it is about this 
matter that labeling theorists are disturbingly silent.
In part, the difficulty rests with labelingfs adherence 
to Head’s interactionist framework. Insofar as labeling takes 
a subjectivist stance, it must deal with each person in their 
own right, facing,. interpreting and dealing with the reactions 
of others (see Blumer, 1969: 61-77). As Lemert (1951: 74-75) 
explains it:
The importance of the personTs conscious symbolic 
reactions to his or her own behavior cannot be overstressed 
in explaining the; shift from normal to abnormal behavior 
or from one type of pathological behavior to another, 
particularly where behavior variations become systematized 
or structured into pathological roles...the self-defining 
junctures are critical points of personality genesis and 
in the special case of the atypical person they mark a 
division between two different types of deviation.
The two types, of course, are primary and secondary deviance, 
a distinction that will be taken up later. For the moment, 
however, it is important to understand that this emphasis 
upon "conscious symbolic reactions” constructs an inescapable 
tautology for the labeling theorists. Any social reaction 
is potentially one that will effectively label a person and 
their behavior, since effectiveness depends upon the deviants 
own symbolic reaction. Effective labels and reactions, accord­
ing to this scheme, are simply those that are effective. This 
accounts for the tendency of observational studies, such as 
Scott’s (1969) analysis of the "blindness system” or Ray’s 
(1964) portrayal of relapse among heroin addicts, to provide 
evidence of labeling by inferring the impact of social responses
15
through the deviant’s own perceptions of stigma.
Nevertheless, labeling theorists, at least implicitly, 
suggest that official reactions—  that is, the reactions by 
police, judges and other formal control agents—  are likely 
to result in labeling. Such determinism is in some respects 
opposed to Mead’s subjectivism, and it is hard not to admire 
the ingenuity with which labeling analysts appear to anchor 
it in a subjectivist framework. Building on some traditional 
ideas of symbolic interactionism Csee Hughes, 1945; Garfinkel, 
1956), labeling theorists describe public reactions as essen­
tially ’’degradation ceremonies.” In a criminal trial, a proto­
typical degradation ceremony, a person’s personality is eras­
ed and replaced with a cultural label-- a ’’rapist” or a ’’thief.” 
Schwartz and Skonlick (19 64) document this effect in a quite 
limited yet frequently quoted study of legal stigma. After 
confronting twenty-five employers with four types of person­
nel folders, each containing a different degree of legal stig­
ma (no record, acquitted, acquitted with a letter of reassur­
ance from the judge and convicted as charged), Schwartz and 
Skolnick found the folders with the most stigma (convicted 
and acquitted without a letter) to fair poorly in the job 
market. One employer expressed interest in a convicted fold­
er; three expressed interest in the acquitted without a letter 
folder. The other two folders were more marketable. Nine 
employers expressed interest in the folder with no. record; 
six employers expressed interest in the acquitted with a letter 
folder. Using similar studies (see Simmons, 19 69; Scheff,
16
19 66), labeling proponents document the existence of similar 
public stereotypes, stereotypes that supposedly come into 
play once a person is officially reacted to as a deviant.
While labeling analysts are uncertain about some reac­
tions, allowing a person’s subjective response to be the 
final word on importance, public reactions are uniformly 
seen as overwhelmingj regardless of the deviant’s symbolic 
interpretation. Mead (1918: 590) himself, in a classic 
essay on the psychology of punitive justice, referred to 
legal stigmas as the modernization of taboos.
I refer to that accompanying stigma place upon the 
criminal. The revulsions against criminality reveal 
themselves in a sense of solidarity with the group, a 
sense of being a citizen which on the one hand excludes 
those who have transgressed the laws of the group and 
on the other inhibits tendencies to criminal acts in the 
citizen himself. It is this emotional reaction against 
conduct which excludes from society that gives to the 
moral taboos of the group such impressiveness.
It is this moral taboo that labeling refers to when it speaks 
of stereotypes, of the deviant’s difficulty in "shaking off" 
public labels and of the compelling nature of being officially 
declared a deviant—  recall Becker’s example of the young 
Trobriand Islander. Although labeling theorists never 
adequately explain why there should be so much agreement about 
the "disdainful" qualities of rule—breakers and so much dis­
agreement about the rules themselves (see Becker, 1963: 15-18; 
Lemert, 1972: 26-61), they still assert that official reactions 
attribute a "master status" to a person’s misconduct, a status 
that changes interaction patterns and effectively alters, in 
time, a violator’s perceptions of himself. Official reactions,
17
then, are reactions that label.
This concern with official reactions has led some label­
ing analysts to explore the creation of formal rules— • that 
is, rules that are enforced by some official group of people. 
Again, labeling theorists, like many conflict analysts 
(see Turk, 1966; Quinney, 1970), argue that modern society 
is characterized by conflicts over values and expectations. 
What is right for one person often proves deviant for another. 
In addition to laws revolving around life, property and per­
son, modern society generates a vast amount of "regulatory 
laws," laws dealing with health, public safety, welfare, 
business practises and transportation. In each of these 
cases, the moral meanings, particularly the moral obligation 
to obey, depends largely on a personTs relationship to the 
group whose interests and values are represented by the rules 
(Lemert, 19 72). The content of laws, and correspondingly the 
rules potentially enforceable by control agents, depends on 
the ability of certain groups to have their values and in­
terests cast into legal forms. In this sense, labeling ana­
lysts rightfully stress that one of the most important deter­
minants of a rule, of its content and who it potentially de­
fines as deviant, is the absence of certain groups in the col­
lective interaction that generates laws. To a degree, label­
ing theorists portray social conflict much as Dahrendorf 
(1959: 179-193) does, in which organized groups generate sup­
port for their values from less conscious groups. The main 
medium for this process, at least for labeling theorists, is
18
the mass media.
To illustrate, Becker (1963: 135— 146), who has done 
some of the conceptual work in this area, describes what he . 
calls moral enterprising as an endeavor to construct part of 
society’s moral fabric. As an example, he interprets the 
passage of the Marijuana Tax Act in 19 3 7 by the United States 
Congress. Principally through the efforts of the Bureau of 
Narcotics, then under the Treasury Department, public concern 
about the ’’dangerous” use of marijuana was generated by a 
public information campaign. Although the Treasury Department 
itself minimized the problem of marijuana in its 1931 yearly 
report, the Bureau generated enough support to have a draft 
of the bill presented before the House Ways and Means Committee 
in 1937. After some minor revisions to safeguard the legitimate 
interests of business, the bill was passed in both the House 
and Senate. Becker (1963 : 145) sums up the. bill’s passage 
as follows: ’’Marijuana smokers, powerless, unorganized, and 
lacking legitimate grounds for attack, sent no representatives 
to the hearings and their point of view found no place in the 
record...The eneterprise of the Bureau produced a new rule, 
whose subsequent enforcement would help create a new class of 
outsiders—  marijuana smokers.”
Similar processes are described in Platt’s (1969) ex­
planation of delinquency laws, Gusfield’s (19 68) interpreta­
tion of the enactment of the Prohibition Amendment, and Duster’s 
(1970) analysis of anti-drug legislations. What is important 
in these studies is that interests are described as sometimes
19
more symbolic than material in nature. As Gusfield argues, 
the Prohibition Amendment is a classic example, for it was 
largely a middle-class, rural, Protestant movement aimed at 
controlling the values of lower-class, urban, Catholic 
immigrants. In this light, the making of rules, especially 
in the instance of moral crusades, is a symbolic act, symbol­
izing the importance or superiority of a group’s way of life. 
Both Duster and Platt make similar arguments. In this sense, 
labeling analysts perceive the legal definition of deviance, 
especially with regard to crimes without victims, as the ef­
forts of middle- and upper-class Americans to formalize their 
values and control behavior they see as deviant. And, of 
course, from a labeling point of view, rule-making is an im­
portant example of how social control causes deviance.
In another sense, however, the significance of moral 
crusades rests not in their origins, but in their outcomes: 
in the legitimation of a police force. In other words, while 
it is up to rule-makers to create categories of deviance, it 
is up to another type of moral entrepeneur, rule-enforcers, 
to apply the laws and create a class of outsiders (Becker, 
1963). Offenders must be discovered, apprehended and convict­
ed, and this job falls to professional enforcers who have 
interests and values of their Own. Accordingly, labeling theo­
rists end up back at the source of labeling, at the applica­
tion of rules by police, judges and other officials (for a 
critique of this circle see Gouldner, 1968; Thio, 1973). In 
the labeling approach, the way in which officials enforce
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rules, the manner in which they recruit people as outsiders, 
largely determines who is and who is not deviant.
Enforcement and the Applicatiori of Labels
Schur '(1971: 82-99) refers to the study of "deviance 
processing” organizations as central to the understanding of 
the ways in which social control shapes and even, in a sense, 
causes deviant behavior. From what has been said, he is quite 
right, at least insofar as labeling is concerned. Rules are 
not uniformly enforced. Some rules are enforced only when 
they result in certain consequences. The unmarried mother 
presents a clear example. While school officials are unlikely 
to approve of promiscuity, they seldom do anything until a 
girl becomes pregnant—  then she is expelled. Some rules are 
applied more to certain people than others. Again, while the 
unwed mother is often forced to leave school,.the boy, who is 
also responsible, is seldom treated in the same fashion.
Some rules, furthermore, are variously enforced over time.
The occurrence of "drives" against certain kinds of deviance, 
like gambling or homosexuality, for instance, indicates this 
clearly. These things taken together suggest the differential 
manner in which rules are enforced. And the manner in which i/' 
officials go about enforcing rules, apprehending people, 
processing deviants, "treating" them and so on, identifies 
those people who are to become known as outsiders.
For the most part, labeling’s contentions are supported 
by the literature on complex organizations. Research in this
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area has repeatedly documented the existence of informal 
rules which emerge within the formal structures of organiza­
tions. In one classic of the field, Gouldner's (1954)
Patterns of Bureaucracy, the consequences of enforcing inac­
tive formal rules, as well as the practicality of their en­
forcement, are described for a company that mined gypsum rock 
near one of the Great Lakes. According to Gouldner, the 
plant moved at an informal pace for many years. Many of the 
employees used plant materials, and for the most part it was 
a pleasant dayfs labor, despite complaints from company 
headquarters about low production and excessive waste. After 
the old manager died though, things changed; headquarters 
sent in a new manager with orders to tighten up. Before long 
miners were being fired for doing things that were previously 
considered legitimate. While the new manager successfully 
reinstated the formal rules with regard to surface operations, 
his efforts to bureaucratize the more dangerous mining opera­
tions failed. In the mines unpredictability was high and 
cooperation was crucial. Gouldnerfs study, like the better 
labeling research, demonstrates the importance of organiza­
tional form and social situations in determining what rules 
will be enforced and who will be labeled deviant.
This informal side of enforcement and its relation to 
social situaions has been brought out in several studies con­
ducted from a labeling orientation. Bittner (1967a), for in­
stance, shows how the rules of policeman and peace officer 
are sometimes exchanged by patrolmen on Skid Row. According
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to Bittner, patrolmen on Skid Row keep the peace by culti­
vating personal relationships with residents, holding little 
regard for culpability, and making decisions geared more 
toward solving situational problems than the formal rules.
At least on Skid Row, rules are applied differentially in 
order to manage residential tension. Similarly, Sundow
(1965) observes the importance of informal arrangements be­
tween the Public Defenderfs Office and the ProsecutorTs 
Office. Often arrangements go beyond simple plea-bargaining, 
reflecting what the public defender and prosecutor consider 
to be a "normal” crime. In this sense, the categorization of 
an act determines what portions of the legal code a deviant 
will be charged with and thus the possibilities for 
plea-bargaining. In both of these cases, as with Gouldnerfs 
study, informal rules emerge between the demands of situation­
al tensions and organizational interests.
Unfortunately, BittnerTs and Sundew*s studies are excep­
tions. Labeling research tends to underplay the importance 
of organizational interests and tensions in generating in­
formal rules. Instead, research concentrates on documenting 
selectiveness in applying labels, principally through the in­
fluence of informal stereotypes. Deviants, Rubington and 
Weinberg (1968: 5) argue, are "persons who are typed socially 
in a very special sort of way. They are assigned to categor­
ies and each category carries with it a stock interpretive 
accounting of any persons contained under the rubric." Label­
ing focuses- on the content of these stereotypes in order
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to describe what kinds of people are more likely to be defin­
ed as deviant. An excellent example of this can be found in 
Piliavin’s and Briar’s (196M-: 210) observations on police 
encounters with juveniles, in which they stress the "cues" 
officers use to distinguish delinquents from nondelinquents.
...both the decision made in the field— whether or not 
to bring the boy in—  and the decision made at the sta­
tion—  which disposition to invoke—  were based largely 
on the cues which emerged from the interaction between 
officer and the youth, cues from which the officer in­
ferred the youth’s character. These cues included the 
youth’s group affiliations, age, race, grooming, dress, 
and demeanor. Older juveniles, members of known delin- 
.quent gangs, Negroes, youths with well-oiled .hair, black 
jackets, and soiled denims or jeans (the presumed uni­
form of ’tough boys’), and boys who in their interac­
tions with officers did not manifest what were consider­
ed to be appropriate signs of respect tended to receive 
the more severe dispositions.
The manner in which control agents sift through a person’s •x' 
behavior, screening out certain acts as unimportant, empha­
sizing still others as indicating a person’s ’’real" self, 
largely determines the intensity of sanctions and the effec­
tiveness of labeling.
The processing of juvenile delinquents is a major arena 
for this type of research. Ironically, juvenile courts, 
which were established in the early nineteen-hundreds to 
curb the stigmatization of troublesome children (Platt, 1969), 
are particularly vulnerable to labeling processes. Juveniles 
can come under the court’s jurisdiction for a variety of mis­
conducts, from ’’incorrigibility" to major criminal offenses, 
and once under the court’s jurisdiction they are subjected 
to a number of "child savers," each using slightly different
informal standards to determine how best to deter any further 
delinquency. The discretion invested in many officials of 
the juvenile system, from the policeman to the judge to the 
probation official, makes stereotypic responses quite likely. 
Cicourel (1968), for example, argues that "appealing and 
attractive" delinquents "who want very much to be helped" are 
more likely to have their behavior interpreted clinically or 
socially than criminally. Outside of demeanor, the labeling 
orientation suggests that ethnicity, socioeconomic status, 
education, age, sex, type of offense and previous record all 
influence whether a delinquent will enter the juvenile sys­
tem, and once in it, how he will be treated (see Thomas and 
Sieverdes, 1975; Thomas and Cage, 197 5; Thornberry, 1973).
Not all labeling research on the application of labels, 
however, has been done on the juvenile system. Some people 
have concerned themselves with more subtle forms of stereo­
typing, especially those forms emerging from professional 
values or.treatment standards. For the most part, this type 
of research is done, on the mental health system or altruistic 
organizations for the handicapped, in which "experts" are 
required to define the degree of deviantness. Scott (1970; 
1969), for instance, in researching the "blindness system," . 
explains that the general definition of blindness is quite 
arbitrary, and that many people classified as blind actually 
have some measurable vision. Consequently, contact with an 
opthamalogist or welfare agent frequently determines whether 
a person is treated as someone having difficulty in seeing or
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as a blind person with residual sight. Similarly, Scheff
(1966) notes that psychiatric and judicial hearings on mental 
incompetency are largely perfunctory, since these officials 
consider it more dangerous to "judge a sick person well than ^  
to judge a well person sick." In one of Schefffs studies, 
although sixty-three percent of the patients did not meet 
legal requirements for involuntary status (they were neither 
severely impaired nor dangerous), virtually every hearing 
recommended commitment. In a final example, Rosehan (197 3) 
conducted a study in which eight people gained entrance into 
different mental hospitals by imitating several psychotic 
symptoms during an admission interview. Immediately on 
entrance, they stopped simulating any abnormal symptoms.
In all twelve cases the pseudo-patients had difficulty in 
establishing their sanity to the different hospitals's 
personnel. After an average hospitalization of nineteen 
days, each was released with the diagnosis "schizophrenia in 
remission." In all three examples, the expectations and 
standards of "experts," regardless of their good intentions, 
played a crucial part in determining who was deviant and 
who was not.
To their credit, labeling analysts focus attention on 
the processes by which deviants are differentiated from 
nondeviants. Although they underplay some important matters, 
such as organizational interests, stress and pressures, they 
highlight the workings of informal stereotypes, especially 
as they operate in the juvenile and other therapeutic systems.
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Such stereotypes influence who is likely to be accused, 
apprehended and treated as deviant, and the likelihood of 
being identified as deviant determines the likelihood of 
being successfully labeled as an outsider.
Consequences of Labeling: Becoming a Deviant
It is one thing to commit a deviant act'—  eg. acts of 
lying, stealing, homosexual intercourse, narcoticsf 
use, drinking to excess, unfair competition. It is quite 
another thing to be charged and invested with a deviant 
character, ie. to be socially defined as a liar, a thief, 
a homosexual, a dope fiend, a drunk, a chiseler, a 
brown-noser, a hoodlum, a sneak, a scab and so on. It 
is to be assigned a role, a special type of category of 
persons. The label—  the name of the role—  does more 
than signify one who has committed such-and-such a 
deviant act. Each label evokes a characteristic imagery. 
It suggests someone who is normally or habitually given 
to certain kinds of deviance; who is literally a bundle 
of odious and sinister qualities. It activates senti­
ments and calls out responses in others: rejection, 
contempt, suspicion, withdrawal, fear, hatred.
This passage by Cohen (1966: 24) accurately portrays the 
crucial distinction between committing a deviant act and 
being invested with a deviant character, which is the basis 
of labeling analysis. The first involves the processes ^  
culminating in an act; the second invloves the processes by 
which accused deviants are socially differentiated from others. 
In a series of important essays on the labeling position,
Lemert (1967; 1972) proposes the significance of this distinc­
tion by pointing out the insufficiency of Merton^ structural 
approach to deviance, in particular his theory of anomie. 
Deviance, Lemert argues, suggests two types of research ques­
tions: (1) how deviant behavior originates and (2) how deviant 
acts are effectively attached to persons, influencing further
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deviance by that person. The first, and the.focus of 
Merton’s approach, arises from a variety of sources for a 
variety of reasons. No single theory, then, whether it pro­
poses ’’strain,” ’’differential opportunity” or some similar 
explanation, can possibly capture the act’s etiological com­
plexity. The second, however, at least for Lemert (1951: 75), 
is the more understandable and sociologically significant, 
for ’’deviations are not significant until they are organized 
subjectively and transformed into active social roles and 
become the social criteria for assigning status.” Lemert, 
as well as other labeling analysts, suggest that consistent ^  
deviant behavior results from social labeling, from the pro­
cesses culminating in commitment to a deviant role.
In this way, Lemert distinguishes between primary and 
secondary deviance. Primary deviance, the deviance that 
Merton focuses attention on, arises for a number of social, 
cultural, psychological and biological reasons, and at best 
it has only minimal effect on a person’s self-concept.
People become alcoholics for a variety of resasons, from the 
death of a loved one or business failure, from an intolerance 
to alcohol or even from participating in some cultural role 
that requires a great deal of drinking. Similar arguments 
are made by Scheff (1966) in his description of residual 
rule breaking and by Becker (1963: 26) in his statement that 
’’most people experience deviant impulses frequently.” Secon­
dary deviance, however, is the organization of deviant behav­
ior into a social role, which becomes a means of "defense,
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attack or adaptation" (Lemert, 1967) to the problems created 
by the social reactions directed toward a personTs primary 
deviance. What is explicitly important for Lemert (1967: 17) 
in this distinction is that it implies not only a shift in 
behavioral patterns but a shift in the "causes" of deviance 
as well: "the original causes of deviation recede and give 
way to the central importance of the disapproving, degrada- 
tional and labeling reactions of society." In other words, 
while the origins of initial deviance are diverse, repeated 
deviance or secondary deviance is caused by a commitment to 
a miscreant role, which in turn is .caused by official labels.
When taken to extremes, this assertion leads to inevi­
table problems for labeling analysts. While the contention 
implies labelingTs explanatory superiority over Merton*s 
structural focus, it also runs against an interactionist 
position. Becker (1960: 36) himself, in an earlier essay 
about components of commitment, argues that initial behavior 
as well as initial interests are important to consider.
Whenever we propose commitment as an explanation of con­
sistency in behavior, we must have independent observa­
tions of the major components in such a proposition:
(1) prior actions of the person staking some originally 
extraneous interest in his following a consistent line 
of activity; (2) a recognition by him of the involvement 
of this originally extraneous interest in his present 
activity; and (3) the resulting consistent line of 
activity.
Essentially, labeling proponents fall into the same trap that 
Cohen C1965) recognizes in structural approaches to deviance: 
they assume discontinuity. In other words, what difference 
is there between anomie theory—  deviance portrayed as an
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abrupt change, as a leap from strain to abnormal behavior—  
and the labeling approach, in which the.original causes of 
deviance disappear, abruptly giving way to secondary deviance 
with the onslaught of social reactions? Some of the problem, 
of course, could be handled by labeling proponents if they 
conceptualized the importance of original motivations, inter­
ests and structure in their studies, yet, for the most part, 
they define away these aspects with the concept of primary 
deviance.
Despite this conceptual problem, labeling analysts right­
fully argue the possibility that social reactions push people 
into deviant roles, A study by Jewell (1962) indicates that 
secondary deviance does occur, although not without some im­
portant influences prior to labeling. "Bill," as Jewell 
refers to his subject, was a Navajo Indian, who was hospital­
ized and diagnosed as schizophrenic without having the usual 
psychiatric workup. At the initial interview Bill was ques­
tioned in Spanish, since he was mistaken for a Mexican.
Bill's failure to respond, however, was interpreted as evidence 
of pathology rather than as a language barrier. Consequently, 
he was diagnosed schizophrenic. Much of Bill's behavior,
Jewell argues, was consistent with traditional Navajo responses 
to stressful situations. Even the grotesque posture Bill dis­
played, the waxy flexibility of catatonic schizophrenia, 
reflected the Navajo*s traditional deference to the white man 
rather than any form of pathology. When interviewed by Jewell, 
Bill explained his posture as complying to what he thought was
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expected of him. In short, Jewell argues that Bill was 
confused by the hospital setting, that he retreated to the 
traditional Navajo passivity in the face of threats and that 
his responses won him a place in one of the hospital’s 
back wards.
A more pure case of secondary deviance is presented 
by Lemert (1951; 1967; 1972) in his study of adult stuttering. 
Although there has been much research into the possible 
physiological and biological causes of stuttering, no satis­
factory explanation has been found, which Lemert argues points 
to the possibility that stuttering is socially caused. 
Accordingly, Lemert argues that early reactions to children’s 
speech, either by family or peers or even speech therapists, 
determine whether stuttering persists into later life. In the 
case of speech therapists, children are often required to 
talk in front of mirrors or in front of other .children in 
order to demonstrate the abnormal movements of a stutterer’s 
mouth. Despite the therapist’s benign intentions, Lemert 
(1951: 159) argues, these efforts result in instilling 
"an unequivocal self-definition as one who is different from 
others.” In time, Lemert concludes, the stutterer adopts 
more fully this self-definition in order to solve identity 
problems posed by interaction, thus entering into secondary 
deviance.
This process of becoming a deviant is represented and 
more fully elaborated by figure 1. People engage in primary 
deviance for a number of reasons. If no one reacts negatively
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to the infractions, they would have little or no effect on 
peopleTs perceptions of themselves. If one of these people, 
for one reason or another, is singled out, reacted to nega­
tively, then he is faced with a new situation. If the reac­
tion is intense, especially if it is the reaction of some
Figure 1: Becoming a Secondary Deviant
SOCIAL REACTION: 
Especially when in 
the form of public 
reaction, creates 
deviant expectations 
for interactional 
processes.
ROLE ENGULFMENT: 
Deviant act is the 
most sanguine aspect 
in interaction with 
others, deviant 
attempts to reduce 
its importance by 
various methods.
PRIMARY DEVIANCE: 
Arising from a 
variety of things, 
of only temporary 
and insignificant 
importance to a 
person’s actual 
self-councept
SECONDARY DEVIANCE: 
If the deviant is 
unsuccessful, he 
enters secondary 
deviance, adopting 
the role as a means 
of solving inter­
actional problems.
public official, the person is likely to become engulfed by 
stereotypic expectations. Keying on some of Becker’s and 
Lemert’s ideas, Schur (1971) describes role engulfment as 
the tendency for deviants to become ’’caught up” in deviant 
expectations, to find that the initial infraction has become
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a highly salient aspect of how others interact with them.
If the deviant can neutralize the reactions, either by seek­
ing support from others or by rationalizing his own behavior, 
he returns to a primary category (the pathway represented by 
the dotted arrow). But if the deviant fails to neutralize the 
reactions of others, he becomes a secondary deviant, succumb­
ing to the expectations of others in order to solve the 
problems presented by role engulfment.
How much labeling, how many reactions must occur before 
a primary deviant becomes a secondary deviant? When emphasiz­
ing the processual nature of their'model, labeling analysts 
argue that secondary deviance seldom occurs over night.
Rather the sequence of interaction involves several instances 
of deviance and social reactions. Lemert (1951: 77) describes 
it as follows:
The sequence of interaction leading to secondary 
deviance is roughly as follows: (1) primary deviation;
(2) social penalties; (3) further primary deviation;
(4) stronger penalties and rejection; (5) further 
deviations perhaps with hostilities and resentment 
beginning to focus upon those doing the penalizing;
(6) crisis reached in the tolerance quotient, expressed 
in formal action by the community stigmatizing the 
deviant; (7) strengthening of the deviant conduct as 
a reaction to the stigmatizing and penalties; (8) 
ultimate acceptance of deviant social status and efforts 
at adjustment on the basis of the associated role.
Still, while labeling analysts portray a variety of social
reactions leading up to secondary deviance, the crisis in
tolerance, and the entrance of formal control agents is the
crucial point in the labeling process. Once publicly/
labeled, secondary deviance is only a matter of time.
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Taken together,'the previous three sections provide, an 
inventory of labeling. The ideas concerning how rules are
made, how rules are enforced and how that enforcement leads
\
some to define themselves as secondary deviants, are all 
components of labelingTs most well-known claim: social control 
causes deviance. In the preface to his essays in Human 
Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control, Lemert (1967; 
1972) describes this assertion as "a large turn away from 
older sociology which tended to rest heavily upon the idea 
that deviance leads to social control.” For Lemert, as well 
as other labeling analysts, previous theories of deviance fail 
to see the "forest for the trees;” they seek the causes of 
deviance in individual pathology, in environmental factors 
and in subcultural values rather than in the processes by 
which some people are socially differentiated from others. 
Although previous theorists, such as the criminologist 
Sutherland (1939: 1), noted the importance of the processes 
by which people make rules and the processes by which people 
react to infractions in understanding deviance, they were 
seldom incorporated into theory. Consequently, labeling, in 
that it describes the relationship between social control and 
deviant outcomes, brings the forest into perspective. But at 
what cost to the trees, at what cost to an understanding of 
deviant behavior is this accomplished?
CHAPTER II 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
The usefulness of any criticism depends on two things:
(1) agreement about what is being criticized and (2) agree-
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ment about the proper grounds for criticism. Judging from 
the literature, labeling*s critics do not agree about either 
of these matters. Some theorists focus on particular parts 
of labeling, arguing that it is too phenomenological (Rock, 
1974) or not phenomenological enough (Warren and Johnson,
1972). Others are dismayed by labelingTs failure to address 
certain traditional questions, such as the origins of deviance 
(Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973), variations in rates of 
deviance across populations (Merton, 1971; Gibbs, 1966), or 
the relativeness of deviance to certain societies (Merton,
1971; Gibbs, 1966). Still others object to labeling’s peculiar 
ideological undercurrents, seeing it as a scantly disguised 
welfare ethic (Gouldner, 1968; Liazos, 1972) as well as a 
jaundiced interpretation of social control (Bordua, 1967; 
Manning, 1975). Recently, Lemert (1974: 457) accurately de­
scribed the confusion by characterizing the field as ’’...under 
attack from so many different quarters, both for what it is 
and for what it is not, that a sense of embattlement is in­
escapable. The diverse, perverse, and tangential nature of
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the criticisms makes it difficult to tell friend from foe.”
Undoubtedly, much of the confusion stems from different 
interpretations of labeling. As we have already seen, the 
approach is sufficiently loose at certain points to suggest 
a variety of readings. A number of contraditions, however, 
result from the assorted grounds on which criticism is based, 
from the differences in opinion about what a good theory or 
a good approach to deviance should accomplish. For instance, 
Gibbs (1966; 1972), perhaps the most prescient critic of 
labeling, consistently objects to the approachTs failure to 
unambiguously distinguish between deviants and nondeviants.
Schur (1971), on the other hand, suggests that this looseness 
is a theoretical strength of labeling rather than a weakness, 
for it accurately displays the fluidness of the social world. 
Neither individuals nor acts are immutably deviant, he argues, 
and any attempt to make such clear-cut conceptual distinctions 
is misguided. Gibbs’s and SchurTs differences are not analytic, 
for both agree that deviance is socially defined, varying across 
time and space; their differences are in how best to incorporate 
relativism in a conceptual scheme.
According to labeling theorists, deviance is better under­
stood as a "sensitizing concept” rather than a definitional
t
or operational term. Adopting Blumer’s (19 69: 140-15 2) distinc­
tion between the two, Schur (19 71) argues that previous theories, 
in that they defined deviance in simplistic ei'ther-or terms, 
obscured .the social aspects of a miscreant identity. Acts 
construed as deviant according to one set of standards may be
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acceptable or even demanded by another set. Even when there 
Is agreement on standards, a deviant act may constitute only 
a small segment of a person's behavior. Consequently, Schur 
(1971: 15) argues that deviance must always refer ,Tto the set ^  
of standards from which (individuals) are said to deviate and 
must always be expressed in terms 'of degree, variation and 
circumstances, rather than in simplistic ’either-or’ classi­
fications." This relativeness is best portrayed by a loose, 
sensitizing conception of deviant behavior, in which social 
processes and the fluidness of the social order are emphasized.
This position accounts for much of labeling’s popularity. 
The social and relative aspects of deviance that labeling 
underscores are consistent with several classical traditions, 
such as symbolic interactionism, conflict analysis and 
phenomenology (see Schur, 1969; 1971). Moreover, labeling 
also converges with several popular ideas about the origins 
of deviance. The implied irreversibility of labeling, of ^  
being a "jail bird" or an "ex-con," coincides with several 
cultural themes-- the good kid who made one mistake and was 
never allowed to live-it-down. More current images of the 
deviant are tapped, too. Interviews with topless barmaids 
or motorcycle gangs (see Douglas, 197 0b) portray deviants 
as nonconformists who are misunderstood by society. All of 
this gives Schurfs argument apparent validity. The popular 
images, the popular themes and the appearance of being anchor­
ed in several important sociological traditions suggest label­
ing’s contribution as an explanatory framework, and the new
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areas of interest, the new subjects for research, suggest its 
value as a heuristic tool.
Certainly, labeling has presented new areas for research, 
and to a large extent, it has directed sociology and criminology 
back to questions about the social origins of deviance. In 
this sense, Schurfs characterization of deviance as a "sensi­
tizing concept" is quite right. But there is an important 
difference between suggestiveness and explanation. The first 
often requires a certain looseness; the second always requires 
clarity and distinction, qualities labeling clearly lacks.
In an early essay on the general aspects of deviancy theory, 
Lemert (1948: 27) himself notes the explanatory ambiguity of 
an interactionist approach.
Interaction is not a theory or explanation at all.
It does little more than set down a condition of inquiry, 
telling us that dynamic analysis must supplement struc­
tural analysis, and is best understood as a necessary 
reaction to the metaphysical explanations of human 
behavior current among nineteenth century writers. A 
further reason for rejecting interaction as a theory per 
se is that it results in a directionless inquiry ending 
in a morass of dog-in-the-mangerish variables, none 
of which have priority or provide a formula for 
prediction.
While labeling does claim the significance of formal reactions 
as explanatory variables, it fails to clearly define exactly 
what such variables explain. To say it explains deviance, is 
to say in their own words that it explains a "sensitizing 
concept," which is to say very little.
The observations that follow are directed toward labeling1s 
lack of conceptual clarity and empirical usefulness, its blur­
ring of the trees for the sake of the forest. While labeling
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theorists suggest the importance of social processes in pro­
ducing deviant outcomes, they do not specify exactly what those 
processes are beyond the most general and rhethorical terms. 
Categories like "overdog" and "underdog" do not imply any 
understanding of interest groups or the ways in which diverse 
interests organize into powerful coalitions. Nor does stating 
that social control causes deviance explain how those outcomes 
occur0 While ideas like labeling, process, social definitions 
and social interaction are highly suggestive, they are not 
developed by labeling analysts,, at least not in any way that 
would benefit meaningful inquiry. Consequently, labeling1s 
conceptual ambiguity is often reflected by the bewilderment 
of sociologists and criminologists to empirically understand 
its ideas.
The Conceptual Forest
In several articles, Gibbs (1966; 1972) points out the 
inherent tensions that exist in labeling between a normative 
and a reactional conception of deviance. When labeling theo­
rists adhere strictly to a reactional conception, their state­
ments are relative in the extreme. In other words, there 
can be no expectation of consistency in either the incidence 
of deviant behavior or in the negative reactions of others, 
since each situation with its unique circumstances determines 
whether or not an act is deviant0 As Gibbs notes, this is a 
major shift from a traditional sociological and criminological 
interest in changing rates of deviance. By conceiving deviance
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solely in terms of reactions, labeling analysts provide no in­
sight into Why different rates of deviance occur in different 
populations. Even if two populations have the same definition 
of deviance and react to deviance in the same manner with the 
same consistency, it is possible that one population may have 
a higher rate of deviancy than the other.
As a result, labeling theorists have not completely 
neglected a normative conception, implying it when a reactional 
definition seems too unconvincing. For instance, Lemert 
(1951; 1967), in his own distinction between primary and 
secondary deviance, implies some concensus about what is 
’’potentially” deviant. Again, both Becker’s (196 3) suggestion 
of ’’secret deviance” and Lorber’s (1967) description of 
self-typing denotes some agreement about what is likely to get 
a person into trouble. With regard to self-typing, if a per­
son anticipates social reaction, defining himself as deviant 
when no actual reaction occurs, it implies some prior know­
ledge of what the community considers right and wrong. The 
very idea of ’’patterned” social reactions, whether it be in 
biases toward the lower-classes or in situations that demand 
responses, suggests normative agreement on the part of at 
least policemen, judges and other officials. Just as people 
tend to share some beliefs about what forms of behavior are 
appropriate, Gibbs and Clark (1965) argue, they share beliefs 
about what forms of reaction are necessitated by certain forms 
of,misconduct.
In part, labelingrs suggestion of normative agreement
results from its failure to explain why and how a label, 
whether it be official or not, identifies an act as deviant.
If two boys steal some money from a grocery store and only 
one is caught, the one caught by the police obviously faces 
different consequences than the one who got away. Does that 
mean that the boy who was caught committed a deviant act and 
the boy who got away did not? A strict interpretation of 
labeling says yes—  but the grocery store owner, the boy who 
got away and even the boy who got caught are likely to think 
differently. As Gibbs (19 66) has pointed out, if the labeling 
theorists are right, then the solution to crime is well within ^  
our reach—  close down the courts, close down the police sta­
tions, close down the mental hospitals. If there is no reaction, 
there is no deviance.
Schur (1971) is correct in arguing that critics have 
tended to overstate labeling1s ambiguities with regard to its 
treatment of deviant acts and deviant persons. Labeling 
theorists do not deny the reality of deviance, as it is some­
times suggested. No one really argues that behavior such as 
rape, homicide, mental illness or robbery would disappear if 
it was not reacted to by someone. Schur (1971), furthermore, 
is correct when he argues that labeling theorists are fully 
aware that acts of deviance, for the most part, accompany*^ 
social reactions in producing deviant outcomes. Labeling’s if 
focus on social reactions is meant to highlight what is socially 
made of a.n act; it does not mean that reactions are necessary 
conditions of deviance. But what Schur, as well as most label-
ing theorists , fails to understand is that by banishing the 
normative conception of deviance from their approach, they 
also banish any possibility of understanding the discrepency 
between infractions and reactions, which rests at the heart 
of labeling’s appeal. If each situation dictates deviance, 
each cluster of circumstances dictates the likelihood of 
reactions, there can be no understanding of why certain acts 
together are reacted to differently than others. This 
question remains unanswered by labeling. It lingers like a 
shadow in their writings, suggesting an explanatory analysis, 
but it is never permitted to enter as a focus in its own 
right. By conceiving deviance as entailing reactions, label­
ing theorists define away the discrepency between reactions 
and infractions instead of explaining it.
Setting aside the discrepency revolving around the deviant 
act, additional problems are encountered with regard to deviant 
identities or secondary deviance. Lemert (1967: 18), to recall, 
contends that "a distinction between primary and secondary 
deviation is deemed indispensable to a complete understanding 
of deviation in modern pluralistic society.” The former 
involves behavior, which although deviant, carries little or 
no consequences for an individual’s future behavior; the latter 
involves behavior that is organized into a deviant role, that 
an individual is committed to as a way of life. Furthermore, 
Lemert, like other labeling theorists, contends that the causes 
of secondary deviance are different from the causes of primary 
deviance. While the distinction between commitment to behavior
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is possible, it is difficult to make clear causal distinctions 
between the two forms of deviance. Implicit in the approach 
is an attempt to explain secondary deviance or "hard-core" 
deviance as resulting from labeling (Taylor, Walton and Young,
1973). But it is not clear how the original causes of deviance 
give way to the coercive effects of social reactions.
Indeed it is possible to describe deviants who never 
come to the attention of social control agents and still per­
sistently commit deviant acts. Becker (196 3: 41) himself 
argues that "an unknown, but probably quite large number of 
people in the United States use marijuana." Obviously, all 
of these people have not been labeled "marijuana smokers" by 
officials, school administrators or the police; if they had, 
it is unlikely that the jails would have any room. Again,
Reiss (1970), in a study on premarital sex, notes that few 
adolescents are ever caught engaging in sexual intercourse.
(The Kinsey report recorded only six discoveries out of every 
one-hundred thousand reported acts of intercourse.) Yet a 
quite larger number, Reiss suggests, adopt deviant sexual 
careers. As Akers (1968: 463) pointedly argues, "the label 
does not create the behavior in the first place. People can 
and do commit deviant acts because of the particular contin­
gencies and circumstances in their lives, quite apart from or 
in combination with the labels others apply to them." Com­
mitment to deviance often exists outside of any contact with 
social control agencies.
Admittedly, labeling’s emphasis on processes provides a
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partial solution to distinguishing the causes of primary 
from secondary deviance. To the extent that "degrees of 
deviance" are identified, it might be argued that continued 
deviance after social reactions requires more commitment on 
the part of miscreants. Thus the marijuana smoker who gets 
caught is more committed to a deviant identity than someone who 
smokes marijuana but has never been labeled as such. Never-V"" 
theless, prior conditions, prior "degrees of deviance" would 
still be important factors in explaining the effects of social 
reactions. If the labeling approach was consistent about a 
processual explanation of misconduct, it would have to talk 
about "degrees" of primary and secondary deviance, which would 
render the original distinction useless.
Rather than forfeit the distinction, labeling theorists 
usually describe a more truncated version of the "process" 
by which people become career miscreants. For the most part, 
they emphasize the stigmatizing, compelling impact of official4^  
reactions, obscuring the influence of intial factors in caus­
ing secondary deviance. In this fashion, they locate the fate 
and very development of deviants in the reactions of social 
control agents (Bordua, 19 67). This exaggeration leaves the 
impression that individuals are drifters one day and career 
deviants the next. Akers (19 68: 46) accurately describes 
this truncated labeling process.
One sometimes gets the impression from reading this 
literature that people go about minding their own 
business, and then—  "wham"-- bad society comes along 
and slaps them with a stigmatized label. Forced into 
the role of deviant the individual has no choice but
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to be deviant. This is an exaggeration of course, but 
such an image can be gained easily from an over-emphasis 
on the impact of labeling.
Such an impression also suggests an odd interpretation of 
modernity by Lemert and other labeling theorists. By portray­
ing secondary deviance as resulting solely from labeling, they 
attribute to the reactions of social control agents the 
forces of primitive taboos.
The "penetrating," "debunking" quality of labeling that 
has won it so much popular acclaim, rests on this misleading 
causal distinction between secondary and primary deviance. 
Primary deviants are supposedly like anyone else, engaging in 
some deviance, but not to "excess." They cannot be blamed 
for their misbehavior, for as Lemert (19 67: 51) argues, "while 
some fortunate individuals by insightful endowment or by 
virtue of the stabilized nature of their situations can fore­
see more distant social consequences of their actions and 
behave accordingly, not so most people." Secondary deviants, 
in that they are recruited from this blameless body of people, 
are thus the unfortunate ones, the unlucky ones who did not 
get away. For instance, one implication of Schefffs (1966) 
study is that people who are not "really" mentally ill get 
categorized as such because of the eccentricity of official 
procedures. While this may sometimes be the case, Scheff 
never provides a means of distinguishing between those who 
are "really" mentally ill and those who are not. Consequently, 
in many labeling studies it is hard to distinguish between 
what is "penetrating" and mere conceptualization.
■ ■
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As with deviant acts, there is some discrepency between
what labeling theorists argue and what they imply. At times
they do portray deviance in a processual manner. In these
instances, their own studies often disprove that secondary
deviance results solely from labeling. For instance, in the
Outsiders, Becker (1953) describes the events in which a
person becomes a "marijuana smoker." Ironically, it is the
lack of social reaction that Becker (1963: 70-71) finds as
influencing a person1s involvement in a deviant career.
(Were you making it much at first?) No, not too much. 
Like I said, I was a little afraid of it. But it was 
finally about 194 8 that I really began to make it strong. 
(What were you afraid of?) Well, I. was afraid that I 
would get too high and not be able to ’op1 , you dig,
I mean I was afraid I would get too high, and pass out 
completely, or do stupid things. I didn’t want to get 
too wigged. (How did you ever get over that?) Well, 
it’s just one of those things, man. One night I turned 
on and -I just suddenly felt real great, you know, I was 
really swinging with it. From then on I have just been 
able to smoke as much as I want without getting into 
any trouble about it. I can always control it.
From the passage it is obvious the respondent was aware of
the consequences of being too "wigged." And from Becker’s
own implications the act is deviant, since he describes it
as basically disapproved of and illegal. But it is not social
reaction but the lack of it that influenced further deviance.
Becker’s respondent, when he found he could handle the drug
in public places without being discovered, "really began to
make it strong."
Undoubtedly, labeling theorists do not believe that there 
is no normative agreement in modern society or that public
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labeling is the only cause of secondary deviance. For the 
most part5 many of the critical arguments presented here have 
been based on exaggerations of the labeling position. But 
labeling theorists, insofar as they fail to consider normative 
agreement, fail to describe the influence of initial causes 
and fail to clearly explain the circumstances in which label­
ing leads to miscreant careers, invite these exaggerations. 
Although most of the difficulties could be worked out, it 
would be at the cost of the approach’s causal distinctions 
and its popular acclaim as a ’’debunking" perspective. The 
processual model would have to be more clearly specified, in 
terms of what kind of reactions, by whom, to what kind of 
deviance, in what kind of situations, before labeling’s claims 
about the impact of social reactions could be fully assessed.
In short, the forest would have to be put in proper perspec­
tive to the trees.
The Empirical Forest
As expected, the general looseness and ambiguity of 
labeling has directly affected the quality and type of research 
that usually appears in the literature. The problems are 
clear. Schur (1971), for instance, describes labeling as con­
centrating on "degrees of deviantness" that result from 
someone’s efforts to "do something about" illicit behavior. 
While labeling theorists are in some agreement that "doing 
something about" behavior means official reactions, how much 
reaction equals how many "degrees of deviantness?" Traffic
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violations are something that most communities feel a need 
to do something about, yet is the reaction toward a speeder 
equal to the reaction toward a bank robber or an environ­
mental infraction? Which is more deviant? While a rough 
continuum is conceivable, one with fairly large categories 
equating certain kinds and frequencies of reactions to specific 
degrees of deviance, labeling theorists have never developed 
one *
To a certain extent, the problem rests in different 
research expectations. While previous theories of deviance 
have been designed to accomodate quantitative techniques, 
labeling is directed more toward qualitative methods. Label­
ing analysis concetrates on matters that are difficult, if not 
impossible, to quantify: the development of a deviant identity,/ 
the elaboration of deviant careers and roles, the interactional 
process between deviants and nondeviants. Even with regard 
to the causes of individual deviance, the labeling approach 
emphasizes processual contingencies that are too elaborate 
for quantification. This point has been made by Cohen (1966: 
43), who suggests that the interactional process leading to a 
deviant act is best portrayed as a "tree." (see figure 2)
The completed pathway—  A, AA, AAA—  represented by a solid 
line is the course of action, according to Cohen, that leads 
to a deviant outcome. The other pathways, represented with 
broken lines, are the other courses that action could take.
As Cohen argues, pathways are not predictable from initial 
states or acts alone; prediction is contingent on the situa-
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tion following each move. Using an interactionist perspec­
tive, then, each pathway is an important possibility and each 
junction represents an important decision-making process. .
Figure 2: Interaction Process and Deviant Outcomes
AAA
AA
AB ABA
ABB
BAA
BA
BAB
BB
BBA
BBB
Within the labeling framework, the interactional process 
leading to a deviant identity is just as difficult to quanti­
tatively verify. Reconsider point AAA as secondary deviance, 
a deviant role and not just a deviant act. Moreover, recon­
sider each junction of lines to be a point in time at which 
A or B is socially sanctioned, receiving .an official social 
reaction. The pathway A— AA— AAA is the most pure example 
of an individual’s movement into secondary deviance. Provid-
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ing some referent of behavior and self-concept could be deriv­
ed, a movement into secondary deviance could be quantitatively 
verified by measuring the effects of sanctioning. Now con­
sider the other pathway, particularly the pathway B— BB--BBB. 
Using the same referents as before, or any other referents 
for that matter, B's movement cannot be said to disprove the 
labeling position, for there is no reason to believe that 
additional reactions, if the graph were extended, would not 
move B more in the direction of secondary deviance. Labeling 
provides no time limitations. As Tittle (197 5) recently 
argues, according to the labeling framework, the presumed 
effects can be considered an extension of the labeling process 
itself. The lack of time boundaries, then, makes labeling dif­
ficult to prove and almost impossible to disprove, a respondent's 
death being the only real boundary.
Consequently, most of the evidence for labeling has been 
taken from qualitative research, yet there are some real prob­
lems in interpreting these studies. As a rule, the evidence 
is a barrage of quotes which supposedly document the effects 
of labeling. The following passage from Goffman's (196 3: 16) 
Stigma is an example.
Whenever I fell, out swarmed the women in droves, cluck­
ing and fretting like a bunch of bereft mother hens. It 
was kind of them, and in retrospect, I appreciate their 
solicitude, but at the time I resented and was greatly 
embarrassed by their inference. For they assumed that no 
routine hazard of skating-—  no stick or stone—  upset my 
flying wheels. It was a- foregone conclusion that I fell 
because I was a poor helpless cripple. Not^one of them 
shouted with outrage, "That dangerous wild bronco threw 
her2"—  which, God forgive, he did technically. It was 
like a horrible ghostly visitation of my roller-skating
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days. All the good people lamenting in-chorus, "That
poor, poor girl fell off!"
It is obvious that the girl dreads the condescending reactions 
of others to her handicap. There is no reason, however, to 
infer from the passage that such reactions have compelled her 
to accept a social role as a cripple. No changes in behavior 
are indicated by the passage. Indeed, the passage can only 
prove that cripples sometimes receive stereotyped reactions 
and that they do not like it.
Even when qualitative research does indicate behavioral 
changes, it is sometimes hard to tell whether the changes re­
present secondary deviance or not. For instance, Scott (19 69), 
developing some of Goffman's ideas, describes five ways in 
which the blind manage stigmatization. The first, the "true 
believer," concurs both behaviorally and subjectively with the 
stereotypes presented by sighted people. Other blind persons, 
however, manage to insulate part of their self image from the 
assaults made by normals; these people conform behaviorally 
but define themselves subjectively as different from other 
blind persons. A third adaptation involves deliberately 
assuming a facade of compliance in order to ease interactional 
problems that are caused by stereotypes. Still others adopt 
the facade for profit. Blind beggars, who literally exact a 
price for their compliance, Scott places in this category. 
Finally, some blind persons actively resist the stereotypes. 
Which of these five adaptations, according to labeling, is 
secondary deviance? The first type clearly is, but the remain­
ing four are not so easily described as examples of secondary
deviance. Of course, labeling theorists could argue, as 
Scott largely does, that the five adaptations are "degrees 
of career deviance." Still, ScottTs descriptions portray 
some blind persons as having more control over their situa­
tions than originally described by Lemert.
Quantitative research also presents some interpretive 
problems. Recidivism, for example, is often assumed to be the ' 
most likely measure of secondary deviance, yet meaningful 
rates of reoccurring criminality are hard to obtain. As Tittle 
(1975 ) argues, rearrest is a poor indicator, since known ^  
delinquents and ex-convicts are more likely to be arrested 
independent of actual criminal behavior. Even if conviction S  
rates are used, they may represent something entirely different 
from career deviance. These rates include parole violations )/ 
of an uncriminal type, such as unmarried cohabitation or 
leaving a certain area without permission. Even when convic­
tion indicates further deviance, it is questionable whether 
those rates represent secondary deviance. Does conviction for 
a gambling offense provide evidence of career deviance for 
someone initially convicted of armed robbery? Again, this is 
a problem of unspecified "degrees of deviance."
Aware of these problems, some researchers suggest measur­
ing changes in subjective states as a test of labeling. "ob­
jective behavioral measures," Meade (19 74: 88) argues, "either 
in the form of official records or self-report responses, lack 
the sensitivity required for valid testing of the labeling 
process." Unfortunately, there are problems in interpreting
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subjective measures as well. In part, the problem is the 
same as that with qualitative studies using personal reflec­
tions: changes in behavior or in self-concept cannot be in­
ferred simply from subjective moods. While it could be argued 
that permanent changes in subjective states would measure the 
impact of labeling, such an experiment would require time 
series data, which most quantitative studies fail to obtain.
A study by Gibbs (19 74) demonstrates clearly the need for time 
series data. While he found delinquents to have low feelings 
of self“worth prior to court dispositions, their subjective 
mood was comparable with nondelinquents after the judge had 
made his decision. Accordingly, if studies do not obtain time 
series data, not even the failure of deviants to record feel­
ings of stigma can be used as proof that labeling does not 
occur. While many researchers have documented a lack of stig­
matization among mental patients and delinquents (see Foster, 
Dinitz and Reckless, 1972; 0 TConnor, 1970; Kirk, 1974; Freeman 
and Simmons, 1961), their findings can only be interpreted 
as inconclusive.
Perhaps the most interesting efforts to quantitatively 
measure labeling are the studies of deterrence. Recently, 
several theorists (see Thorsell and Klemke, 1972; Tittle,
19 75) have noted the similarity between labeling and the much 
older deterrence perspective. Both are interested in how and 
why certain groups respond to particular behavior, and both 
are interested in the effects of those responses (Tittle, 1975). 
The major difference, of course, is the prediction of the
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effects of sanctioning, the deterrence model suggesting that 
people are repelled from deviance by official reactions. 
Chambliss (1966), for instance, found parking violations to 
decrease as punishment became more certain and severe. Similar­
ly, in a study of shoplifting, Cameron (19 64) found nonprofes­
sional "snitches” to refrain from stealing after they were 
apprehended for the first time, being caught and compelled to 
admit they were "thieves" or "criminals" proved too discordant 
with their self images as housewives and good citizens. Other 
Studies of deterrence, especially those controlling for certain­
ty and severity of punishment, have documented similar findings 
(see Schwartz, 19 69; Waldo and Chirico, 1972; Tittle and Rowe, 
1974). While these studies do not disprove labeling, they do 
suggest that the effects of official reactions are more complex 
than labeling theorists usually imply.
Besides the effects of social reactions, some of labeling's 
other claims present empirical problems for research. In par­
ticular, the studies investigating the application of labels 
by official control agents, especially when taken together, 
are difficult to interpret. In two critiques of Scheff's (1966) 
study, Gove (1970a; 1970b) argues that behavioral factors, 
other than those implied by stereotypes, are crucial in deter­
mining who is admitted into mental hospitals. He lists several 
studies (see Mendal and Rapport, 1969; Bittner, 19 67b) that 
report public officials process only those whose behavior has 
become too serious, too troublesome to the community. The 
evidence, according to Gove, is that the vast majority of
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persons admitted to mental hospitals do have some .’’real 
disturbance.” Studies in the area of juvenile delinquency 
have produced an equal amount of conflicting evidence. In 
their review of the literature, Thomas and Sieverdes (1975:
416) go so far as to say, ’’even a superficial review of the 
relevant literature leaves one with the rather uncomfortable 
feeling that the only consistent finding of prior research is 
that there are no consistencies in the determinants of the 
decision-making process." (see Goldman, 1969; Wilson, 1968; 
Terry, 1967; Pawlak, 197 3; Arnold, 19 71)
Several reasons for these inconsistencies have been sug­
gested. Bordua (1967) argues that some discrepency can be 
accounted for by different levels involved in processing 
deviants. The policeman on his beat, the intake officer mak­
ing decisions and the judge in his courtroom all face different 
situations with different interests. Thomas and Cage (197 5) 
suggest another explanation: inconsistencies result from the 
different ways researchers operationalize labeling’s concepts. 
Since labeling theorists never specify the "degrees of reaction" 
they have in mind, different measures are quite likely. But 
this inconsistency makes it almost impossible to relate the 
findings of one study to another. In other words, are stereo­
types in probation referrals equivalent to stereotypes in 
commitment decisions, or is selectiveness in the juveniles 
picked up by police the same as selectiveness in those that 
are adjudicated? Still another explanation is that differences 
in social control agencies greatly influences the manner in
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which labels are applied. Gove (1970a; 1970b) suggests that 
some of Schefffs claims are likely to occur in older mental 
institutions. With regard to juvenile delinquency, Wilson 
(19 68) argues that stereotypes are more likely in the arrests 
of traditional police departments than in professional ones.
Empirically, the labeling approach is somewhat of a night­
mare. Whether using qualitative or quantitative techniques, 
the approach fails to specify what measures are appropriate 
or even what boundaries are proper on the time it takes for 
a ’’conversion." ' As Lemert (1951: 74-) originally described it, 
movement into secondary deviance may be gradual or ’’self-defi­
nitions or self-realizations (may) be the result of sudden 
perceptions." While there have been some quantitative studies 
suggesting deviant outcomes from labeling (see Ageton and 
Elliot, 1974; Williams and Gold, 1972), the difficulty of 
operationalizing measures makes it hard to access their 
importance. Most of the suggestive studies have been quali­
tative, yet with few exceptions they have also been unsystem­
atic, making their finding inconclusive. Davis (1972: 457-458) 
tersely describes this aspect of labeling research as suffer­
ing from a "methodological inhibition in which conceptual 
impoverishment is facilitated by an absorption with general 
imagery, with unsystematic, elusive, and suggestive empirical 
presentations, rather than definitive tests of an interaction 
framework." The same could be said of labeling*s research 
into the application of labels. Qualitative research, such 
as Cicourel’s (19 68) or Piliavin*s and Briarfs (19 64), suggest
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the workings of official stereotypes, yet more systematic 
quantitative efforts reveal a much more complex picture, in­
fluenced by levels of organization and kinds of social reac­
tions. In both instances, labeling fails to specify its key 
concepts enough to clear up the empirical confusion.
What can be said of labeling? Certainly it brought 
the forest, brought an emphasis on social processes, into its 
approach. But emphasizing what is socially made of an act or 
person and providing the framework for understanding these 
things are two different matters. The one involves rhetoric, 
the other conceptual depth. Labeling, for the most part, 
seems more rhetorical than lucid. Rather than develop some 
of the issues it raised about earlier theories, like the 
difference between normative and reactional conceptions of 
deviance, it defined the issue away. Rather than develop the 
circumstances under which people might become secondary de­
viants or attempt to explain why some people never become 
secondary deviants, labeling theorists defined the exceptions 
away. Labeling brought in the forest, but it obscured the 
trees. Undoubtedly, the idea of secondary deviance, the 
differential selection and application of labels to deviants, 
and the issues of normative and reactional discrepency can all 
be clarified, developed and tested. But in order to do so 
some of labeling*s more cherished claims will have to be for­
feited, and a fresh look will have to be taken at the forest 
once again.
CHAPTER III 
SOME NOTES ON DEVIANCE IN MODERN SOCIETIES
Pointing out labelingTs conceptual confusion is not the 
same as pointing out its conceptual uselessness. While clarity 
is the prize of science, it is not the only goal. On occas- 
sion more can be learned from an obscure approach and the 
reasons for its obscurity than from the most precisely stated 
theories. Loose ends sometimes provide a means by which to 
unravel the most complicated ideas or a means by which to. at 
least distinguish some of an i d e a ^  major strands. Labeling, 
with its focus on what is socially made of an act, provides 
such an occassion.
Despite some eighty years of research, sociologists and 
criminologists are still puzzled about what precisely is 
deviant behavior. Although theorists traditionally define 
deviance as a normative transgression, many rightfully argue 
that this conception deceptively implies a clear distinction 
between deviant acts and conforming ones. For instance, some 
years ago, Simmons (196 9) conducted a study in which he asked 
180 people to indicate what behavior they considered to be 
deviant. His respondents listed over one thousand examples 
of miscreant behavior , ranging from wearing a. beard and "going 
straight" to homosexuality and murder. Simmonrs research
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clearly demonstrates that almost any act is deviant in the 
eyes of someone, but in whose eyes are sociologists to view 
deviant behavior?
Even if it is argued, as many sociologists do, that de­
viance is the transgression of iriajor rules, of widespread 
cultural standards, a normative definition is still mislead­
ingly straightforward. For one thing, many theorists question 
whether any broad cultural norms can be identified in modern 
societies, or whether they exist only within subcultures and 
smaller collectivities. Even with regard to codified norms 
or the law, people disagree significantly about when a law 
applies or whether it should be applied at all. Then too, 
some sociologists argue that norms are best visualized as 
flexible rules and elastic standards, applying to only certain 
situations, at certain times and to certain people. Even a 
moment’s reflection suggests a great many examples that occur 
in modern societies. If the actions of people do not always 
match the community standards to which they give verbal alle- 
gience, are all normative infractions to be considered deviant 
behavior?
In recent years, labeling theorists have unraveled some 
major strands of deviance. Their emphasis on the social defi­
nition of situations, on the manner in which people negotiate 
or fail to negotiate the moral meanings of their actions, high­
lights the flexibility of norms in modern communities. In this 
sense, labeling theorists CErikson, 19 66; Douglas, 19 70a) have 
described the study of deviance as the analysis of the construe
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tion and reaffirmation of moral meanings in everyday life.
As an aspect of moral negotiation in modern societies, label­
ing highlights the role social reactions, varying both in 
intensity and form, play in arbitrating definitions of deviance. 
By including less aberrant forms of deviance, such as the 
mentally ill, the handicapped and the blind, labeling analysts 
portray the different forms reactions take in modern communi­
ties, and concomitantly the different consequences reactions 
create in defining situations. But the final arbitrator of ^ 
deviance for labeling is the official social control mechanism. 
In this sense, labeling theorists describe social control as «/ 
the mechanism by which modern communities deal with moral am­
biguity: it labels certain forms of behavior as unacceptable; 
it interprets the point at which "something must be done;" it 
provides a class of OutsidersT as referents for less official 
decision-making. With these strands, labeling attempts to 
weave an inherently modern conception of deviant behavior.
Some of the reasons why labeling fails to elaborate these 
insights, fails to follow through with these strands, have 
already been shown. For the most part, the reasons presented 
in the previous section represent labelingfs unique failures, 
unique conceptual and empirical problems. There is at least 
one other reason, however, and this it shares with many theories 
of deviance: it fails to distinguish social types of deviance. 
Although Schur C19 71) and others describe deviance as a 
"sensitizing concept," encompassing "degrees" of social dis­
approval, they never suggest a manner in which these "degrees"
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might be seen as types. Rather they leave the discomforting 
impression of building a ’’thermometer of deviance,” by which 
each degree of deviance can be seen to correspond to a degree 
of reaction, and the social boiling point represents the en­
trance of official control agents. It is an odd impression 
for an approach that rejects a great deal of quantitative re­
search because it presumably neglects to understand the sub­
jective meanings attached to forms of deviant behavior.
While there are a great many types used in both sociology 
and criminology (see Clinard and Quinney, 1973), few are de­
veloped in a manner consistent with labeling’s concern for the 
social meanings of deviant behavior. A majority of constructs 
are empirical typologies, developed by correlating different 
behavioral, legal ana social variables in order to identify 
property space. Still other typologies are developed around 
the social contexts in which deviance occurs (Lindesmith and 
Dunham, 19 41; Gibbons, 19 65) or the behavioral systems in which 
crime occurs (Clinard and Quinney, 1973). A few attempts at 
conceptual grouping have been applied to inmate cultures 
(Irwin and Cressey, 19 64; Schrag, 19 66). Perhaps the typology 
most consistent with labeling’s focus is one developed by 
Cavan (1962), in which principal consideration is given to 
public reaction and the criminal’s reaction to the public. 
Cavan’s analysis of interaction between criminals and the public 
produced seven types of deviant behavior, ranging from criminal 
contraculture to minor overconformity to ideological contra- 
culture. Although Cavan’s typology, as well as some of the
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others, provide some insights into the different social 
dimensions of deviance, it is not developed to distinguish 
social meanings attached to deviant behavior.
In the pages that follow, four ideal types of deviance 
will be constructed. Keeping with labeling’s focus, the types 
will be developed using kinds of reactions, consequences of 
reactions and the social meanings appropriate to each. A 
quick review of the literature suggests agreement about four 
distinct areas of research, each with distinct social defini­
tions: Cl) respectable, (2) involuntary, (3) aberrant and 
(4) dissident deviance. While there is general agreement that 
these areas can be distinguished, their conversion into ideal 
types and the manner in which they then should be used is like­
ly to be more controversial. Some years ago, Weber (1949: 
49-112) described ideal types as the conceptual strategy of 
the social sciences; today few sociologists consciously use 
the technique, considering it too impressionistic and empiri­
cally rootless (Sjoberg and Nett, 1968). Consequently, a brief 
explanation of Weber’s contention and the current misunderstand­
ing about ideal types is in order before turning to the 
development of the constructs.
The Logic of Ideal Types
Some current misunderstanding about ideal types stem from 
Weber’s own presentation of the technique. In a series of 
important essays about methodology in the social sciences,
Weber (1949: 93) makes several clear statements about what is
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not an ideal type: they cannot be defined by ’’genus proximum’’ 
or ’’differentia specifica;’’ they are not hypotheses to be 
tested or categories under which concrete examples can be sub­
sumed. In other words, ideal types are not averages or 
natural classifications of social variables, and thus they 
cannot be empirically verified. But when it comes to describ­
ing precisely what is an ideal type, Weber is considerably 
less clear, relying on metaphors to make his point.
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation 
of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of 
a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
and occassionally absent concrete individual phenomena, 
which are arranged according to those one-sidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytic construct.
. It cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.
It is a utopia.
Unfortunately, this passage provides little additional under­
standing of what is an ideal type, since metaphors are hard 
to pin down. Consequently, interpretations of Weber’s presen­
tation have tended to rest on his negative statements. But as 
any logician will argue, negative definitions provide innumer­
able opportunities for misinterpretation.
Not surprisingly, several misconceptions about ideal 
types are held by many sociologists and criminologists. For 
one, some theorists argue that Weber’s constructs are unlikely 
to be useful, since they are both impressionistic and empiri­
cally rootless. After all, how does someone test a utopia?
For Weber, of course, you do not, at least not in the sense of 
a hypothesis to be proven or disproven by empirical facts.
But this does not mean that Weber saw ideal types as empirically
rootless or as unverifiable. Judging from Weber’s own use 
of ideal types Csee Bendix, 1962), it is possible to use these 
constructs to describe ’’adequate causal relations” (Weber,
1949: 80) of historical events, such as India’s caste system 
or the development of American capitalism. In order to 
accomplish this, Weber argues, ideal types must be based on 
’’meaningful” traits—  that is, they must capture the idea 
behind certain social acts; he referred to this aspect of 
ideal types as ’’general empirical rules” that reflect the way 
in which men and women are likely to behave in certain situ­
ations. Consequently, ideal types can be verified. To the 
extent that they capture ideas of practical significance, they 
will have logical significance for social scientists. In this 
sense, the validity of an ideal type rests not on its empiri­
cal replication, but on the extent to which it can guide in­
vestigations, suggest adequate causal relationships and lead 
to more precise understanding of the social world.
Still another misconception revolves around using ideal 
types as typologies (see Clinard and Quinney, 197 3; Wood,
1969). In an essay on methodology, Wood (19 69: 239) argues 
that ideal types must satisfy the requirements of any typology: 
”(1) Are the assumptions regarding the theoretical links be­
tween variables of the type capable of being tested empirically 
(2) Does the classification of cases by the typology lead to 
more convincing demonstrations of their explanation?” A close 
reading of Weber, however, suggests that ideal types cannot 
be seen as typologies. For one, typologies are matrices
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composed of several different dimensions of equal conceptual 
importance. By classifying cases into various cells of the 
matrix, relationships between the original dimensions can be 
discovered. Ideal types, however, are constructed by accent­
ing a single dimension which in itself suggests an ”objectively 
possible” causal relationship (Weber, 19M-9: 92). Furthermore, 
the function of an ideal type is not to provide a scheme for 
classification, but to provide'an ideal construct with which 
to elaborate significant components of social phenomena. In 
other words, research faces the task of determining the extent 
to which these constructs reflect reality—  the extent, for 
instance, the economic organization of a city can be viewed 
as a ”city-economy" or the domination of a state can be seen 
as ’’legal-rational." While both ideal types and typologies 
are essentially heuristic devices, the logical significance 
of ideal constructs rests in its ability to elaborate dissim­
ilarities as well as similarities with social phenomena.
The previous paragraph provides the elements with which 
to make a positive description of ideal types. Ideal types, 
according to Weber, are neither empirically rootless nor 
typologies with which to classify social phenomena. Instead 
they are interpretive schemes based on patterns of behavior 
that suggest ’’subjectively meaningful” relations between 
different aspects of social phenomena. In this manner, ideal 
types are both heuristic tools and the basis for theoretical 
construction. On the one hand, they provide an ideal, a limit­
ing construct to compare with and thus survey the significant
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components of social'relations; on the other hand, by focus­
ing on values and motivations of practical significance, 
they suggest adequate causal relations between social phenom­
ena. In this fashion, the final judge of any ideal type 
is its utility in understanding the social world.
To illustrate, Hempel (1963) argues that these aspects 
of ideal types can accurately be compared’ to theories of 
natural sciences, particularly those found in physics. In 
the natural sciences, Hempel explains, a unique event is 
accounted for by the prior or concomitant occurrence of 
several variables in an ideal situation. Galileo’s law of 
gravity, for instance, argues that objects of equal density 
fall at equal.velocities in a vacuum. By this relationship, 
Galileo suggests several variables important in understanding 
the effects of gravity. Similarly, with regard to charismatic 
domination, Weber outlines the variables pertinent to under­
standing authority based on the "extraordinary qualities of 
a leader" (see Bendix, 1962: 298-328). When taken together, 
these variables describe a cause.of domination in an ideal 
situation. In this sense, Weber’s explanation of charismatic 
leadership, like Galileo’s law of gravity, provides a point 
of comparison with which to interpret reality. Accordingly,
Weber uses this ideal type to explicate the manner in which 
Christ’s personal charisma was institutionalized in the 
Catholic Church of the Holy Roman Empire. The value of ideal 
types, like the value of many laws in physics, rests in heuristic
and interpretive potential.
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Ideal types are particularly amenable to the issues 
characteristic of the labeling approach. Both share a focus 
on definitions of situations, on subjective meanings attached 
to behavior and both suggest causal relationships revolving 
around those meanings. Furthermore, ideal types are essential­
ly heuristic devices to be used for conceptual elaboration.
In a passage that could serve as an insight for labeling 
analysts, Weber (194-9: 10 2) makes this quite clear.
In the interest of the concrete demonstration of an 
ideal type or of an ideal-typical developmental
sequence, one seeks to make it clear by the use of con­
crete illustrative material drawn from empirical-histori­
cal reality. The danger in this procedure which in it­
self is entirely legitimate lies in the fact that his­
torical knowledge appears as a servant of theory instead 
of the opposite role.
In other words, if labeling theorists had originally portrayed
secondary deviance as an ideal construct, they would have
compared it to various situations, highlighting the influences 
that prevent labeling in order to better understand the in­
fluences that reinforce deviant careers. Consequently, ideal 
constructs are a particularly useful device for clearing up 
some of the conceptual confusion surronding labeling’s treat­
ment of the social meanings of deviance.
Four Ideal Types of Deviance
The following pages will present four ideal types of 
miscreant behavior: (1) respectable, (2) involuntary, (3) aber­
rant and (4) dissident deviance. From the previous statements 
on ideal types, the characteristics of these constructs can be 
quickly described. Keeping with Weber’s design, the attributes,
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values and behavior accented by each type will be based on 
"general empirical rules"—  that is, they will be drawn with 
an eye for establishing an adequate causal relation. Keep­
ing with labelingrs concerns, the subjective meanings attach­
ed to each form of deviance will be related to corresponding 
social reactions and consequences of sanctioning. For these 
ideal types, verification rests with, their heuristic potential 
and theoretical suggestiveness, rather than with their exact 
correspondence to actual social phenomena.
Respectable deviance-- Although informed middle-Americans 
overwhelmingly see the problem of crime in terms of lower-class 
behavior, they are also quite aware of many other forms of 
deviance that appear in the newspapers everyday. Watergate, 
for instance, with its lengthy cast of characters and melo­
dramatic moments, was probably the most publicly broadcasted 
American scandal since McCarthy and his "witch hunts" during 
the 1950s. But when it finally came to an end and Nixon 
resigned, it was not at all clear what Americans considered 
to be serious. Across the nation prominent newsmen gave public 
sighs of relief— the crisis was over, the scandal put to rest, 
Americans would be saved from the "torments" of Impeachment.
And sighs were given by less prominent Americans, too; not 
because the Presidency had been spared, but because they had 
been spared from the torments of week after week of televised 
Impeachment hearings. To a large extent, the seriousness of 
NixonTs crime was not that he had covered up a burglary, but
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that he had covered it up so badly and caused so much trouble.
Mills referred to such events as news of higher immoral­
ities, and he suggested that Americans were quite accustomed 
and hardly surprised by its announcement. But to a certain 
extent, this higher immorality is also a lower immorality. 
Research on embezzlement, employee pilfrage, traffic viola­
tions, shoplifting and similar forms of respectable crime 
suggest that these infractions are quite widespread, exceed­
ing the more conventional forms of deviance in losses of 
property and life. In a study of traffic violations, for 
instance, Ross (1960-61) notes that 37,000 people died in 
auto accidents as compared to 3,850 cases of murder and non- 
negligent manslaughter in 19 58. Similarly, Schur (19 69) 
suggests that the total amount of losses resulting from em­
bezzlement are probably twice as much as the total amount 
of losses accruing from burglaries, armed robberies, auto 
thefts and pickpocketing. Both higher and lower immoralities 
are quite widespread in America, costing people considerably 
more than conventional forms of crime. Why, then, does 
it raise so little alarm?
One reason is that these are forms of respectable deviance. 
In traditional societies, respectable deviance is clearly 
defined by sacred ceremonies, in which normally miscreant acts 
are encouraged and legitimized. In modern societies, the 
social boundaries of respectable deviance are considerably 
less clear; perhaps disasters are the most clearly legitimate 
grounds for deviance (Dynes, 1970). Nevertheless, respectable
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deviance in modern communities is shaped and promoted by 
underlying values within.American culture (Schur, 1969).
For instance, business practises reflect two conflicting poles 
of values. On the one hand* transactions are supposedly govern­
ed by a code of ethics which emphasizes honesty, trust and 
public accountability; on the other hand, the smart business 
deal, the quick transaction and the ’con' are also values of 
the business world. For those who engage in illegal activity, 
there is a ready made list of justifications and values with 
which to define their behavior as respectable deviance.
Respectable deviance is misconduct by respectable people 
occurring in respectable situations or occupations. Such 
behavior only occassionally provokes strong social reactions, 
since in many ways it is supported by values that either 
directly encourage deviance or justify it as a common form of 
misconduct. This is particularly true with regard to amateur 
shoplifters who steal as if they were competing against store 
officials. Accordingly, in these instances, deviance is a 
positive attribute. He is a "strong" President; she is a 
clever operator; she is a smart businesswoman. In the eyes 
of the respectable deviant, and often in the eyes of those who 
react to him, he is not a criminal; while his actions may be 
technically against the law, his behavior is not immoral. It 
is probably for this reason that when respectable deviants are 
caught and confronted with criminal labels they often discon­
tinue any further misconduct, the label being too incongruous 
with their personal image (Cameron, 19 64).
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Involuntary deviance—  Involuntary deviants are seen as 
not responsible for their behavior. All societies in some 
form or another recognize this type. In traditional communi­
ties, involuntary deviants are likely to be seen as possessed 
by a demon or some evil spirit. Whichever is the case, the 
social meaning is the same: "this person cannot be blamed for 
his behavior." In modern societies, the amount of involuntary 
'deviance is likely to te greater than that characterizing 
more traditional communities. Yet, this increase results from 
the redefining of involuntary deviance rather than from an 
actual increase in its occurrence. Modern communities give 
rise to specialization, and along with this trend is a rise 
in deviance specialists.
In recent years, Kittrie (1973) notes, this trend has 
been particularly evident in America. While criminal law in 
traditional societies assesses blame, determines degrees of 
guilt and punishes miscreants accordingly, America has witness­
ed a subtle departure from these functions in its criminal 
system. A different legal model has steadily been developing 
which is described variously as "civil," "therapeutic" or 
"parens patrie." In this system, according to Kittrie, little 
or no emphasis is placed on an individual's guilt, rather 
importance is attached to a person's physical, mental or social 
shortcomings. When dealing with deviants, society is said to 
act in a parental role (parens patrie), seeking not to punish 
but to change, resocialize, treat or cure the miscreant through 
some appropriate therapy. The consequences for involuntary
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deviants are subtly different from those of pther miscreants. 
Under the criminal model, a deviant, say a prostitute, is 
punished; she is given a fine to pay, a sentence to serve or 
possibly both. Under the therapeutic model, however, the 
prostitute is not punished but treated, and the treatment, 
which may be complete confinement, is not terminated until an 
expert decides she has been "cured." While the differences 
may be subtle, they are certainly crucial.
Perhaps the most obvious example of involuntary deviance 
is mentall illness, yet ^similarities can be found in several 
other forms of illicit behavior as well. Lorber (1967), for 
example, suggests that sick roles are convenient labels with 
which to manage personal problems. In the factory setting, 
in personal relations and in interactional situations disabil­
ity is sometimes faked to provide a legitimate reason for 
escaping obligations. Similarly, in recent years alcoholism 
has been defined as a disease. Principally through the efforts 
of Alcoholics Anonymous, Trice and Roman (1970) argue, an 
"allergy concept" of alcoholism has been gained. According to 
this view, those who become alcoholics possess a physiological 
allergy to alcohol, and consequently their addiction is deter­
mined long before they ever take their first drink. As Trice 
and Roman (19.70: 540) argue, "the significance of this concept 
is that it serves to diminish., both in the perceptions of A.A. 
members and their (family and friends), the alcoholicTs re­
sponsibility for developing the behavioral disorder."
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While the significance of involuntary deviance rests 
in a disavowel of responsibility and in the corresponding 
efforts by experts to return the miscreant to a "responsible" 
state, the consequences vary according to the instances. For 
example, members of Alcoholics Anonymous actively seek to di­
minish any interpretation of their behavior as mentally ill.
The idea of an allergy is conspicously medical, and the organ­
ization visibly attempts to associate itself with the medical 
profession (Trice and Roman, 1970). In the case of physical 
or medical disorders, a person is not blamed; in the case of 
mental disorders, a person is not trusted. Regardless of 
the form, however, involuntary miscreants are not blamed for 
their behavior, and to the extent that they are subjected to 
therapy, they are reliant on the discretion of those experts 
who define deviance.
Aberrant deviance—  When most Americans talk about the 
crime problem, they talk about aberrant deviance. In tradi­
tional societies, she is the woman perpetually in the stocks 
or the man being led slowly up the steps to the public gallows. 
In modern communities, she is the woman being picked up by the 
vice squad or the man serving a life sentence in a Federal 
Penitentiary. They are the murderers, the armed robbers, the 
rapists, the muggers. Their behavior is feared, and their 
faces are strikingly lower-class. For the most part, these 
are the people that middle- and upper-America pay lawyers, 
judges, policemen, prison guards and prison officials to 
manage, to protect them from.
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As the term aberrant implies, these deviants are seen 
as morally inept, at least by conventional society. Their 
behavior is against the law, and unlike respectable deviance 
it is viewed as wrong. Their deviation from the standards^ 
are seen as culpable and a reflection of their personal 
character. When Mead and Durkheim spoke of behavior that 
aroused public anger, provoked the taste for revenge and re­
awakened in the community a sense of moral solidarity, they 
were describing aberrant deviance. Accordingly, this form 
can provoke intense reactions from communities, and, indeed, 
popular lore and actual history are full of examples. Dur­
ing the Chicago democratic convention in 19 68, the police en­
gaged in what many saw as respectable deviance when they 
clubbed and beat demonstrators protesting American involvement 
in Viet Nam. Undoubtedly there were a number of reasons for 
the police’s use of "unusual tactics," such as Daley’s conven­
tion floor power tactics, it was in part a community reaction 
to perceived aberrant deviance.
Aberrant behavior, like respectable deviance, is generally 
seen as guided by personal interests. Unlike respectable 
deviants, however, aberrant persons are not as fearful of a 
criminal label. Irwin and Cressey (1964) suggest that prison 
cultures are influenced by several more general deviant cul­
tures. Two of these, thief and convict cultures, actually con­
tain values regarding behavior during imprisonment. Thieves 
or professional criminals, Irwin and Cressey argue, face a 
reoccurring' problem of imprisonment. Consequently, most are
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aware of norms and patterns of behavior which apply to the 
prison situation, and information on how to manage the prison 
experience—  how to do time "standing on your head"-- with 
the least amount of suffering and in the minimum amount of 
time. Those who Irwin and Cressey describe as convicts also 
face a reoccurring adjustment to imprisonment. But for these 
"hard core" prisoners, the majority of which are lower-class, 
norms and patterns of behavior appropriate to the prison situ­
ation are recognizable in America1s lower-class values. In 
both cases, the aberrant deviant is aware of the criminality 
of his behavior, and he is prepared to manage the sanctions 
applied to him because of it.
The aberrant deviant, like the respectable deviant, 
contains both an image of the offender and an image of the 
offense. Study after study, Clinard and Quinney (1973) argue, 
portray the aberrant offenses, aberrant victims and aberrant 
offenders as being part of the poorest and most deteriorated 
sections of the major cities. The aberrant pursues his be­
havior for personal interests, and frequently he is aware of 
norms that suggest the proper-means of coping with imprison­
ment or official reactions. The consequences of reactions 
are varied, but at times when sanctions are harsh, they are 
likely to stir anxiety and anger from the aberrant themselves. 
While aberrants tend to be morally indifferent toward their 
behavior, neither condemning nor justifying it, they do per­
ceive a sense of justice, a set of informal rules that govern 
the breaking and enforcing of laws. Since sanctions can vary
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in intensity, a sense of injustice sometimes occurs, giving 
objection not so much to the rules but to the rule enforcers.
Dissident deviance—  Merton (1971) has referred to this 
form of behavior as nonconforming. In a brief section of his 
C on temp or ar y Social Problems, Merton argues that there is 
considerable difference between the courageous highwaymen of 
seventeenth-century England and the equally courageous noncon­
formists, like Oliver Cromwell, of that same time. While such 
a distinction seems obvious, it is one made easy by historical 
detachment. In the instance of the Chicago riot, there were 
a great many judgments at the time that made the leaders of 
the march little more than criminals (or worse yet communists) 
heading up a sizable band of hoodlums and miscreants. These 
deviants, especially becuase they tend toward organized pro­
test, can only be euphemistically called nonconformists. The 
term dissident is more appropriate.
Aberrant, involuntary and dissident deviance are very 
closely related forms of miscreant behavior; the distinction 
between each resting for the most part on whose view is being 
considered. Dissidents, in that they openly violate community 
norms, challenging the legitimacy of established values, are 
often seen by officials as aberrants. At other times, dissi­
dents, especially if thy deviate alone, are sometimes defined 
as involuntary miscreants. In both instances, the effect is 
the same: community definitions neutralize the appeal to;/ 
"higher values" or an "ultimate morality." From SolzhenitsynTs 
portrayal of Soviet political control and the history of the
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student movement in the sixties, both methods, aberrant and 
involuntary counterdefinitions, are viable, modern responses 
to dissident behavior.
Dissidence is usually not a private form of deviance.
The dissident is not trying to make extra dollars by juggling 
the books; nor is he making a living by stealing from others.
The dissident deviates for a new morality or for the restora­
tion of an old social goal. Unlike the involuntary deviant, 
the dissident accepts responsibility for his actions; unlike 
the aberrant and respectable deviant, he disavows legitimacy 
of the social standards, seeking by his actions to either change 
the law or bring into focus a new standard. For these reasons, 
the dissident often seeks to be publicly caught, to be given 
a chance to publicly voice his opinion. Consequently, sanc­
tioning by police, judges and others often leads to increased 
dissidence, increased attempts to make opinions and views 
known to those who will listen. The actions of the Viet Nam 
protestors, such as Abbie Hoffman, for example, were directed 
toward making actions more visible, particularly after their 
initial confrontation with authorities.
Dissidence is not easily carried out alone. The ability 
to make a dissident definition stick depends largely on the 
legitimacy of others. It is easier for the dissident to con­
vince others that he acts not for personal gain if he does not 
act alone. In the same way, it is easier for the dissident to 
avoid an.,involuntary label if he does not act alone. The 
ability to organize, to present conflicting views in a group
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setting, largely determines the dissident definition. Regard­
less of organization or group support, however, dissidents 
are likely to seek out public sanctioning, and increased 
sanctioning is likely to encourage increased dissidence.
A Brief Application: Juvenile Delinquency
Part of the utility of ideal types rests in their mutual 
exclusiveness on an analytic level, another part rests in 
their relationships in actual social phenomena. Weber, for 
instance, constructed his ideal types of domination in order 
to analytically accent three dimensions of authority: charisma, 
traditional and legal-rational. As precise ideal points of 
view, they demonstrate their value by organizing the diverse 
aspects of a dimension into logically consistent analytic 
units. But their most impressive demonstration of value rests 
in their application to social phenomena. Accordingly, Weber 
uses each type to reveal the tensions and modified relations 
inherent in the other forms of domination. In construction, 
each type represents a single logically possible causal re­
lation; in application, each type provides a point of compari­
son with which to understand a number of social phenomena, 
casual relations and thus theoretically possible interpreta­
tions. In this sense, Weber rightfully insisted that ideal 
types be verified according to their heuristic potential rather 
than according to their exact replication by empirical facts.
Consequently, the four ideal types just presented must
.be applied in order to suggest their heuristic validity. As
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the previous presentation shows, these types do overlap in 
reality and do suggest relationships between themselves. At 
one point, the connections between involuntary, aberrant and 
dissident deviance were outlined, along with some of the cir­
cumstances that affect the application of these social defi­
nitions. At another point, the relationships between respec­
table and aberrant deviance, particularly with regard to 
nonprofessional shoplifters, were touched upon. Additional 
applications are needed, however, before determining the 
heuristic potential of these types. In the following para­
graphs, a brief application of the types to juvenile delin­
quency suggests some of this interpretive.potential.
The American juvenile justice system reflects an involun­
tary model of deviance. The official role of court officials, 
probation officers and welfare agents is to "treat" the delin­
quent, preventing him from going on to become an aberrant 
deviant. While culpability and punishment do play a part in 
the juvenile justice system, they are, at least officially, 
subordinate to the role of "parens patrie." The Standard 
Juvenile Court Act, proposed by the National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency and designed to serve as a voluntary model for 
various states, exemplifies the therapeutic discretion invested 
in juvenile justice officials.
The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in 
proceedings: 1. Concerning any child who is alleged to 
have violated any federal, state or local law or municipal 
ordinance, regardless of where the violation occurred...
2. Concerning any child...(b) whose environment is
injurious to his own or others’ welfare; or 
(c) who is beyond the control of his parents or 
cutodian. (Kittrie, 1973: 117)
While the first clause seeks specificty, the second clause 
of the Act invests an almost limitless amount of discretion 
in the juvenile official. An adult must be charged with a 
criminal act if he is going to be held by the police; but a 
juvenile may be held because he lives in an ’’unsuitable” 
environment or is ’’beyond” the control of his parents, regard­
less of whether he is accused of committing any criminal act. 
As Kittrie (1973: 117) argues, this represents ’’...the perplex 
ing possibility under the juvenile court system whereby a 
person can lose his liberty not for something he does but ^ 
for something he is_. ”
Delinquents, however, are unlikely to view the juvenile 
justice system in the same manner. Unlike with mental or 
physical health, there is no widespread interpretation of 
delinquency as involuntary, the logical connection being con­
siderably more tenuous. Consequently, while juvenile official 
operate according to the expectations of an involuntary system 
of treatment, delinquents, depending on their behavior and 
socioeconomic status, are likely to see their deviance as 
either respectable or aberrant. By most reports, almost every 
child engages in some form of delinquent activity during his 
legal status as a juvenile, and for those who are arrested, 
the differences in expectations suggest some interesting 
consequences for sanctioning.
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Deterrence is on possible effect of sanctioning, espe­
cially with respectable delinquents. Like their adult counter­
parts, respectable delinquents are usually deterred from 
further deviancy by the application of an aberrant label. 
Clinard and Quinney (1973), for instance, note that many re­
spectable delinquents, especially those arrested for property 
offenses or vandalism, express feelings of remorse or peni­
tence. Apprehension, in other words, leads to the delinquent’s 
reevaluation of the meaning of his deviance—  "we didn’t 
think about being caught, we were thinking about having fun;” 
"It didn’t seem like then it would amount to much;” ”1 didn’t 
think it would cause so much trouble.” In these instances, 
deterrence results from the act of being publicly confronted 
with a deviant label that is too discordant with a juvenile’s 
self image. Aberrant delinquents, on the other hand, are 
not as likely to be deterred by sanctioning. Yet there is no 
reason to believe that they are never deterred from further 
deviance. Since aberrants engage in more "serious” acts of 
delinquency, they are likely to generate stern reactions.
If these reactions prove "too much,” the aberrant will desist 
from further deviance also.
Encouragement for further delinquency is another possible 
effect of sanctioning. At this point, the conflict in defini­
tions between delinquents and officials suggests some interest­
ing causal relations. Respectable delinquents, for instance, 
may be encouraged by the efforts of juvenile justice officials 
to minimize the impact of"apprehension and neutralize the
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application of criminal labels. But the respectable delin­
quent , not seeing himself as blameless, may interpret this 
discretion as ineptness on the part of juvenile officials.
In other words, he may see himself as "conning the system,n 
and thus he may be encouraged to commit further delinquency.
Of the two types, aberrant delinquents are the most likely 
to be encouraged by the sanctioning originating from involun­
tary systems. If the sanction is too lenient, the aberrant 
is provided with a relatively "inexpensive” means of.demonstrat­
ing his courage and toughness, or his cunning and savvy to his 
peers. Aberrant delinquents, however, are more likely to re­
ceive Severe sanctions, and if the sanctions are especially 
severe, he is likely to sense or directly experience inequity 
in the system (Matza, 1964). In other words, the discretion 
invested in juvenile officials is likely to be interpreted 
by aberrants as unfair sanctioning, as being "singled out" 
for punishment or as being "made an example."
The relations suggested above are objectively possible. 
Their description, however, is only the first step in using 
these ideal types. Undoubtedly, the juvenile justice system 
operates within some combination of aberrant and involuntary 
models of deviance. An additional step, therefore, would con­
sist of decomposing the system into those parts and situations 
where an aberrant or an involuntary model are usually applied. 
Just as the juvenile justice system is more complicated, so 
too are the attitudes and definitions that delinquents carry 
about themselves and their actions. What modifications are
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likely if an upper-class boy is caught committing an aberrant 
act? Conversely, what modifications are likely if a lower- 
class boy is caught committing a respectable act? All of these 
things suggest additional steps needed to fully understand 
the utility of the types for the study of juvenile delinquency.
Nevertheless, some of the heuristic potential of these 
types has been demonstrated. In light of'the ideal types, 
labeling’s indiscriminate assertion that stigmatizing reactions 
cause deviance proves to be greatly oversimplified. With 
regard to respectable delinquents, it was suggested that sanc­
tioning usually results in deterrence. And when it does not, 
when sanctioning leads to further delinquency, it is because 
of the neutralization, not the maximization, of stigmatizing 
labels. Even with regard to aberrant delinquents, labeling’s 
claims are too simplistic. When further delinquency occurs, 
it is because of either a sensed injustice or an overly lenient 
sanction. While the first reason bares some resemblance to 
Lemert’s idea of secondary deviance as a role for ’’attack,” 
the second reason suggests something different from labeling’s 
central tenets. If the application of the ideal types to the 
juvenile justice system is any measure of their heuristic 
validity, these types should prove helpful in clearing up some 
of labeling’s conceptual confusion in other areas of deviance 
as well.
CONCLUSION
What can be said about the labeling approach? Certainly 
it focuses attention on the social aspect's of deviance., on 
the importance of social definitions and reactions to a com-/ 
plete understanding of deviance in modern society. Accord­
ingly, labelingTs greatest contribution is that it surpasses 
the research interests of earlier practical pursuits-- such 
as predicting who will violate parole, who will become delin­
quent or who in general is more likely to commit deviant acts.
In other words, labeling refreshingly redirects research and 
theory beyond the legitimate but narrow concern with the causes 
of deviant behavior. By focusing on the moral meanings im­
plied in interaction, by deliberately directing studies toward 
understanding the significance of social definitions and 
reactions, labeling breaks the theoretical silence about social 
influences, a silence that has characterized the study of 
deviance for too long.
Under the labeling lens, Lemert (1972: 3-25) rightfully 
points out, the proper understanding of deviance is a critical ^  
understanding of the larger society and its relationship to 
the marginal groups that are singled out by social control as 
outsiders. In this’ sense, if the study of deviance is to be 
intellectually serious, it cannot be restricted to the study
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of esoteric and exotic groups—  of topless barmaids and 
swinging suburbanites, of motorcycle gangs and delinquent 
street gangs. Rather the study of crime and deviance must 
concern itself with some of the broader social implications of 
miscreant behavior. In other words, labelingfs concern with 
the, social meanings of deviance, their differential applica­
tion and their relationship to larger patterns of social order 
all suggest a refreshing return to some of the basic issues 
proposed by classical social theorists.
In the preceeding paragraph the phrase "proper understand­
ing" is crucial. For in the final analysis, it is against 
this standard that labeling must be measured, and it is against 
this standard that labeling is found clearly wanting. Critical 
understanding, especially the kind espoused by labeling the­
orists, requires conceptual depth and precision-- a quality 
that the approach unfortunately lacks. Rather than develop 
the issues raised about earlier theories, like the distinction 
between deviant acts and deviant labels, labeling theorists 
defined the issues away. Rather than develop the causal inter­
actions between initial and secondary deviance, labeling theo­
rists defined away the exceptions. As the critics of the 
approach rightfully argue, labeling is excessively loose and 
prone to vulgarization; its central claims are often contradic­
tory and almost impossible to empirically verify. Although 
the labeling approach locates a crucial traget for research 
and theory, it fails to provide the means, the conceptual frame­
work that would adequately aim explanatory efforts.
8 5
The last section of this paper presented a strategy for 
understanding some of these conceptual issues, especially 
those revolving around the influence of social meanings on 
deviant behavior. The four ideal types—  respectable, invol­
untary, aberrant and dissident deviance— • outline four dis­
tinct social meanings that are associated with deviance and 
suggest some interesting relationships. "Some of these rela­
tionships were demonstrated with regard to dissident behavior 
and juvenile delinquency, but even a cursory reflection on 
the types suggests several other areas and possible relation­
ships. In order to explain the social issues highlighted by 
the labeling approach, in order to at least better understand 
the complexity of those issues, an exstensive amount of con­
ceptual exploration and elaboration is needed. An ideal type 
approach, especially as it was outlined by Weber (1949), is 
quite amenable to these needs.
Nevertheless, there are some logical objections that 
might be raised about this approach to labeling's conceptual 
confusion. Ideal types are not a widely accepted methodologi­
cal strategy. Even in Weber's own time, their use generated 
some pointed criticisms. In the Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, Weber (1958) formulated ideal types for 
both American protestantism and capitalism, and then used the 
former to explain the latter's occurrence. Several critics 
(see Tawney's foreward to the 1958 edition) strongly objected 
to Weber's "exaggerations" of ethical factors. Today, dis­
approval is all the more likely, since ideal types are not
86
directly amenable to empirical research. Weber, to recall, 
concerned himself with historical trends and their explana­
tions, and considering his topics ideal types were very use­
ful and efficient* On a lower level of abstraction, however, 
given the need to operationalize concepts, does not an ideal 
type approach fall victim to the same empirical rootlessness 
that chracterizes labeling? Does not an ideal type simply
replace one obtuse construct with yet another?
Perhaps. But perceptual bluntness in this instance 
would be caused more by the nature of sociology and criminology 
than by the strategy itself. A case, although a somewhat
tendentious one, can be made for the assertion that labeling
was originally intended as a heuristic and not an explanatory 
framework. This is especially true with regard to Lemertfs 
(1951; 1967; 1972) writings. In this sense, the approach’s 
conceptual confusion resulted from the nature of the discipline. 
Rather than explore the conceptual relations suggested by 
the approach, sociologists and criminologists pushed it into 
a neat, unambiguous scientific box—  if A (social reaction) \/ 
than B (secondary deviance). In the years surronding Becker’s 
(1963) Outsiders, most theorists were interested in being 
associated with labeling’s radical tone; in the years surrond­
ing popular scepticism, most theorists are interested in 
being associated with labeling’s ffpungent and perceptive" 
critics. During both periods, few seemed interested in elabo­
rating or salvaging its research tragets. Of course, explor­
ation and elaboration tend to demand more patience, more in
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depth analysis than the current need to "publish or perish" 
might allow. This is to say that the approach, the use of 
ideal types, rests its utility on the sociological concern 
to penetrate some complex and difficult problems, and this 
reliance might well be its most wanting characteristic.
In a sense, all of this argues the importance of 
research into social definitions, into the subjective mean­
ings attached to behavior. As Weber well understood, the 
practical types expressed by men and women, the values and 
goals to which they verbally aspire, often provide insightful 
points of comparison. This is, of course, the classical 
methodology, the one that guided the intellectual excitement 
of such diverse theorists as Marx, Durkheim, Tonnies and 
Weber in their comparison of desired social values with what 
actually exists. Such a methodology applied to sociology 
and criminology itself, might suggest a number of interesting \/ 
relations, interesting disparities between what is desired 
and what actually occurs. It might suggest what makes a 
"good" theory of deviance or what makes a "bad” one; and, 
of course, it might suggest the utility of using ideal types, 
or any other heuristic framework for that matter, in socio­
logical and criminological inquiry. But then that is 
another assessment.
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